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ABSTRACT
In the traditional corporation context, faced with a claim that a board of
directors breached its fiduciary duty when it made a decision (or took an
action), a court will focus on the financial impact on shareholders only; that
is to say, the court will find that the directors met their fiduciary duty as long
as their decision maximized shareholder wealth. (And the court may not
even make it that far; if the business judgment rule applies, the court will
defer to the directors’ decision entirely.)
The job of the court is somewhat more complicated when it must review
the directors’ decision using the entire fairness standard (the standard applied
when the board is not properly functioning, perhaps due to a conflict); in that
case, the court must confirm that the board of directors followed a fair
process, and that in turn led to a fair price. One simplifying factor is that the
court need only think about fair process and fair price with reference to the
shareholders, who are primarily benefited by, or harmed by, the directors’
decision.
The rise of benefit corporations (a hybrid business model where
directors are required to balance the interests of shareholders and
stakeholders) presents a serious challenge for the application of the entire
fairness standard of review; it is terra incognita, or uncharted territory for
courts (there is, as of yet, no case law directing courts how to proceed).
When faced with a claim that the board of directors at a benefit corporation
breached its fiduciary duty, the court will need to confirm that it (the board)
followed a fair process and obtained a fair price, but now with regard to both
*

Associate Professor of Law & Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility Fellow, Fordham
University Gabelli School of Business. LL.M. in Corporate Law, New York University
School of Law; J.D., Syracuse University College of Law. Thanks are in order to Victor
Borun, Elizabeth Cosenza and Iftekhar Hasan for their comments on prior drafts. Thank you
to Alison Rae for research assistance. All views expressed, and errors made, are wholly my
own. Fordham University provided grant assistance, for which I am grateful.

842

2020]

TERRA INCOGNITA

843

shareholders and stakeholders, including customers, employees, suppliers,
local communities, and the environment.
This Article explains how the traditional entire fairness standard of
review—i.e., examining decisions through the dual-lens of fair process and
fair price—can be modified by courts to work in the benefit corporation
context as well. In short, this Article suggests that courts confirm that the
decision-making process employed by directors was designed to gather
information regarding impacts on shareholders and stakeholders. As to fair
price, this Article suggests that courts confirm that directors made
adjustments to price that reflect the fact that the entity is a benefit
corporation, and relatedly, be open to new valuation methods that account
for impacts on stakeholders.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2019, the Business Roundtable, in conjunction with 181
CEOs, released its Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation.1 This new
document affirmed that a significant portion of large corporations are
discarding the traditional shareholder-centric model, and adopting in its
place a stakeholder-centric model, where the corporation commits to
generate long-term value for shareholders, while also supporting customers,
employees, suppliers, local communities, and the environment.2
Statutory law is also beginning to reflect the rise of the stakeholdercentric model. Starting in 2010, state legislatures began to pass new
legislation allowing for the formation of benefit corporations.3 Delaware
passed its benefit corporation legislation in 2013 (the Delaware Benefit
Corporation Law or DBCL).4 Delaware’s legislation requires directors to
“balance[] the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of
those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific

1. Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 2019),
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/BRT-Statement-onthe-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V94N-HZSK]
[hereinafter Statement on the Purpose].
2. Id.
3. The first benefit corporation legislation was passed in Maryland. Act of Apr. 13,
2010, ch. 97, 2010 Md. Laws 980 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS
§ 5–6C–01(2017)).
4. An Act To Amend Title 8 Of The Delaware Code Relating To The General
Corporation Law, 79 DEL. LAWS, c. 122, § 8 (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 361–368 (2018)).
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public benefit . . . identified in its certificate of incorporation.”5 Today,
benefit corporation legislation is adopted in thirty-six states and the District
of Columbia;6 and the Accountable Capitalism Act (ACA) proposed by
Senator Elizabeth Warren would supercharge that effort, requiring directors
at large corporations (greater than $1 billion in gross receipts) to consider the
impact of decisions on stakeholders, without regard to whether they had
voluntarily elected to be a benefit corporation.7 (The ACA is modeled on
state benefit corporation legislation).8
Directors at benefit corporations—which are undeniably bound by the
strictures of benefit corporation legislation—face a difficult task; they must
make decisions with an eye toward pecuniary return to shareholders (as the
traditional shareholder-centric model has always mandated), but also with
an eye toward the impact on customers, employees, suppliers, local
communities, and the environment (as the new stakeholder-centric model
now mandates).9
Where the directors’ balancing analysis is challenged in court, and the
entire fairness standard of review applies (entire fairness is the most
searching of the standards of review applied in Delaware10), judges will be
required to carefully scrutinize the directors’ balancing analysis; judges must
embark upon their own balancing analysis, a journey into terra incognita,
uncharted territory.11
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2020).
6. State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net/po
licymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/3H47-3HJK] (last visited Apr. 21, 2020).
7. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5(c)(1) (2018).
8. Technically, both the ACA and the DBCL are outgrowths of the Model Business
Corporation Law (MBCL). Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Accountable Capitalism Act One-Pager,
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Accountable%20Capitalism%20Act%20One
-Pager.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE2G-GRZW] [hereinafter ACA One-Pager].
9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2020).
10. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“Delaware has
three tiers of review for evaluating director decision-making: the business judgment rule,
enhanced scrutiny, and entire fairness.” (citing Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d
442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011))). Entire fairness applies when the there is a controlling shareholder,
the board itself is interested in the transaction, or the board is otherwise not operating properly.
See infra Part II.C.
11. The inspiration for the title of this Article, “Terra Incognita”, is drawn from the
following quote from Admiral John Lort Stokes, who once shared a room aboard the H.M.S.
Beagle with Charles Darwin:
We were now once more stepping out over a terra incognita; . . . all was clothed
with the charm of novelty. The feelings of delight which are naturally aroused in
those whose feet for the first time press a new and rich country, and which I have
so often before endeavoured in vain to express, burst forth on this occasion with
renewed intensity.
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It is terra incognita because courts are accustomed to applying the entire
fairness standard of review in a uniquely shareholder-centric way (i.e.,
traditionally, courts give no consideration to the impact of a decision on
stakeholders).12 Let me explain:
Traditional Fair Process Analysis. The court focuses on the
information gathered by the directors (did the directors gather information
regarding how shareholders will be impacted?), and the negotiation process
(did the directors zealously negotiate on behalf of the shareholders?).13
Traditional Fair Price Analysis. The court focuses on the price paid to
shareholders.14 In the context of decisions to merge, acquire or be acquired,
the price must be the “highest transaction price the market will permit”15 for
the shareholders’ stock.16
And thus, this Article arrives at this normative question: How should
Delaware courts17 apply the entire fairness standard of review in the benefit
JOHN LORT STOKES, 2 DISCOVERIES IN AUSTRALIA 163 (1846). As will become clear, applying
the entire fairness standard of review to benefit corporations is terra incognita, but as the quote
also suggests, it is territory that we can approach with delight.
12. It is true that some Delaware cases suggest in dicta that directors can take into account
impact on stakeholders. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955
(Del. 1985) (suggesting that the business judgment rule allows directors to consider, among
other factors, effect of takeover on “creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the
community generally” when enacting defensive measures). However, considering other
constituencies may only be done when there is also a related benefit accruing to the
stockholders. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986); see Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of
Corporate Governance, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1411 (1993) (saying courts can
consider the interests of other stakeholders only when they do not conflict with the interests
of shareholders).
13. Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
14. Id. at 712.
15. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859,
874-875 (2001).
16. Here, the use of the term “highest price” to define “fair price” may be somewhat
controversial. However, it is consistent with Delaware case law. See Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1134, 1142 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 1994) (stating that the fair price was the
“highest value reasonably available”); In re First Boston, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 10338, 1990
Del. Ch. LEXIS 74, at *21 (Del. Ch. June 7, 1990) (“Nor is [it] sufficient to get a price that
falls within a range of ‘fair values’ somehow defined, if the fiduciary (or another) would pay
more.”); but see Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146, at *6
(Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003) (“The value of a corporation is not a point on a line, but a range of
reasonable values, and the judge’s task is to assign one particular value within this range as
the most reasonable value in light of all of the relevant evidence and based on considerations
of fairness.”).
17. While this Article focuses on Delaware courts, the lessons are readily transferable to
any of the other thirty-five states that have adopted benefit corporations.
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corporation context? Phrased differently: how should Delaware courts
apply a shareholder-centric test in a stakeholder-centric world?
This Article takes a three-step approach to answering that question: Part
I explains the difference between a traditional corporation and a benefit
corporation (here, it is important to recognize that the overriding
difference—i.e., that benefit corporations are stakeholder-centric—
necessarily requires that the entire fairness standard of review be applied
differently). Part II explains how the entire fairness standard of review is
applied to decisions to merge, acquire or be acquired at traditional
corporations—distilling the essential elements of entire fairness analysis.
Thereafter, Part III suggests how those elements can be applied to decisions
to merge, acquire or be acquired at benefit corporations. Part IV discusses
entire fairness in the context of operational decisions. This Article then
concludes.
In short, the answer to the normative question posed is as follows:
Modified Fair Process Analysis. When conducting the fair process
portion of the entire fairness test, the court should, in addition to confirming
that the board of directors gathered information about the impact of the
decision on shareholders, also confirm that the directors gathered
information about the impact of the decision on stakeholders.18 For example,
in addition to commissioning a fairness opinion from an investment bank
(focused on price paid to shareholders), did the directors also commission a
report quantifying (in dollar terms if possible) the impact on stakeholders?
Modified Fair Price Analysis. When conducting the fair price portion
of the entire fairness test, courts have traditionally focused on whether the
directors achieved the highest price the market will permit for the
shareholders’ stock.19 I suggest that, when benefit corporations are involved,
the court should:
(1) confirm that the directors made adjustments to the price that reflect
the fact that the entity is a benefit corporation;
(2) be open to new valuation methods that take into account social
impact (as is necessary to achieve (1));20 and
(3) where the process was robust, the court should take comfort in that
fact, and be more deferential to the price arrived at by the parties.21

18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.D.1.
See infra Part III.D.2.
See infra Part III.D.3.
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I. POSITIVE LAW MEETS STAKEHOLDER THEORY
For at least a century, legal scholars have debated whether positive law22
should require corporate directors to maximize the return to shareholders (a
shareholder-centric model), or instead focus on stakeholders more generally
(a stakeholder-centric model).23
However, while scholars were busy debating, positive corporate law
increasingly grew to embrace the shareholder-centric model.24 Today, a
short passage from the Supreme Court of Michigan’s 1919 decision in Dodge
v. Ford dominates any discussion about the role of corporate directors: “The
powers of the directors are to be employed . . . primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.”25 While the foregoing statement may be controversial in
academic circles,26 it is clearly reflected in the positive law of Delaware (with
22. Positive law is statute and case law. This Article focuses on Delaware positive law,
because Delaware is where a majority of corporations are formed. Press Release, Jeffrey W.
Bullock, Del. Sec’y of State, A Message from the Secretary of State, https://corp.delaware.g
ov/stats/ [https://perma.cc/LM2T-FTSL] (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (stating that 67% of
Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware).
23. In 2001, Hansmann and Kraakman wrote, “[o]ver the past decade, the literature on
corporate governance and corporate law has sometimes advocated “stakeholder” models as a
normatively attractive alternative to a strongly shareholder-oriented view of the corporation.”
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 447 (2001). However, the roots of the debate go back much further than that, to the
debate between Adolf Berle and Merick Dodd in the 1930s. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (“[A]ll powers granted to a
corporation or to the management of a corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.”); E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145,
1161 (1932) (“[T]he association, once it becomes a going concern, takes its place in a business
world with certain ethical standards which appear to be developing in the direction of
increased social responsibility.”).
24. Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 121, 172–73 (2016) (“[T]he dominant view of corporations may currently
favor shareholder primacy and profit maximization.”); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate
Profits In The Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 736–38 (2005) (describing the
traditional view that directors must maximize corporate profits); Judd F. Sneirson, The
Sustainable Corporation and Shareholder Profits, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 541, 551–552
(2011) (“Corporate law . . . projects a shareholder-centric bent in describing the nature of
corporate fiduciaries’ legal obligations . . . the recurring message is that shareholders and their
profits trump all other considerations.”).
25. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919).
26. Some prominent scholars object to any assertion that the purpose of the corporation
is to maximize shareholder wealth. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC passim
(2012); Elhauge, supra note 24, at 738 (“Corporate managers have never had an enforceable
legal duty to maximize corporate profits.”); but see Miriam F. Weismann, The Missing

2020]

TERRA INCOGNITA

849

the recent exception of Delaware’s Benefit Corporation Legislation).
William B. Chandler III, Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery from
1997 to 2011, wrote in Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,
“[d]irectors of a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot . . . eschew[]
stockholder wealth maximization—at least not consistently with the
directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law.”27 Leo E. Strine, Chief
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court from 2014 to 2019, wrote in his aptly
titled article, Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit
Corporations Seek Profit, “the corporate law requires directors, as a matter
of their [fiduciary duties], to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits
for the stockholders.”28
However, just because something “is” (positive law), does not mean it
“should be” (normative law). At times, the development of positive law lags
behind the broader views of society. In 2018, Larry Fink, CEO of Blackrock,
wrote, “[s]ociety is demanding that companies . . . not only deliver financial
performance, but also show how [they] make[] a positive contribution to
society.”29
And as mentioned in the introduction, in August 2019, the Business
Roundtable in conjunction with 181 CEOs released Statement on the
Purpose of a Corporation, affirming that a significant portion of large
corporations are discarding the traditional shareholder-centric model and

Metrics of Sustainability: Just How Beneficial Are Benefit Corporations?, 42 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1, 5–6 (“For those scholars dedicated to a stakeholder agenda, the case law and other legal
precedent pose no obstacle to arguing both in favor of a corporate duty to the “other
constituencies” and for an outright rejection of shareholder primacy.”).
27. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2010).
The duty to maximize shareholder wealth is perhaps most obvious when a company is being
sold. See Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (“In
the sale of control context, the directors must focus on one primary objective—to secure the
transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders—and they must
exercise their fiduciary duties to further that end. The decisions of this Court have consistently
emphasized this goal.”); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986) (“The duty of the board . . . [is] the maximization of the company’s value at
a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.”).
28. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit
Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012).
29. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: Purpose & Profit,
BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceoletter [https://perma.cc/HU8H-C2FG] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). Even the large law firm of
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, which represents many super-sized corporations such as
Ebay and TD Ameritrade agrees. See Martin Lipton, It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://corpgov.law.ha
rvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-to-adopt-the-new-paradigm/ [https://perma.cc/53WT-6MBE].
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adopting in its place a stakeholder-centric model.30
In those situations where the development of the common law lags
behind societal change (or where it has moved such a “considerable distance
in one direction [that it] cannot retrace its steps”31), correction by legislation
may be required.32 And indeed, that is what has occurred. Concerned that
the case law would not catch up with the growing societal acceptance of
stakeholder theory, state legislatures began passing legislation authorizing
benefit corporations (which mandates directors both produce profits for
shareholders and benefit other stakeholders).33 Further, presidential
candidate Elizabeth Warren has proposed the ACA, which would require all
large corporations to obtain a federal charter that would mandate both
producing profits for shareholders, as well as benefiting other stakeholders.34
A. State Benefit Corporations
State benefit corporation legislation is a reaction to the requirement that
directors of traditional corporations pursue profit maximization. Benefit
corporations are designed for social entrepreneurs who have an idea for
improving society that “is too much of a ‘business’ for the nonprofit form
and too ‘socially conscious’ for the for-profit corporate model.”35 This is
sometimes characterized by commentators as doing well (financially), while
doing good (socially).36
30. Statement on the Purpose, supra note 1.
31. To stick with our one-way street metaphor, even if we could back up, the distance
back to the crossroads, the point at which we took a wrong turn, if it was indeed a wrong turn,
is a long one, and slow (a car can only go so far in reverse). The process of case law
development is necessarily gradual. 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 88 (1979); see William B. Chandler III
and Leo E. Strine, Jr., Views From The Bench: The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 988–989 (2003) (discussing that the common law is slow to evolve
and sensitive to context).
32. See HAYEK, supra note 31, at 88 (discussing legislative correction of common law);
see also M. Stuart Madden, The Vital Common Law: Its Role in a Statutory Age, 18 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 569 (1996) (“[C]ommon law approaches may also be subject
to statutory correction where there is neither public nor legislative consensus that the common
law rule satisfies an instrumentalist objective—an objective either to encourage worthy
conduct, or to deter harmful or wasteful conduct.”).
33. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5–6C–01(2017); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, §§ 361368 (2018).
34. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5(c)(1) (2018).
35. Tu, supra note 24, at 158.
36. Adi Ignatious, Profit and Purpose, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2019, at 10;
FREDERICK H. ALEXANDER, BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW AND GOVERNANCE:
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The DBCL is no different.37 It empowers businesses to do “well” and
“good” by statutorily altering the purpose of the corporation, as well as
statutorily altering the fiduciary duties owed by directors.38
1. Statutorily Altering the Corporate Purpose
The DBCL expressly alters the purpose of the corporation.39 The statute
provides that a “‘public benefit corporation’ is a for-profit corporation . . .
that is intended to produce a public benefit[s] . . . and to operate in a
responsible and sustainable manner.”40
Thus, as expressed in the DBCL, the purpose of the benefit corporation
is to promote a public benefit while also making a profit. The DBCL takes
this one step further, requiring that each benefit corporation’s certificate of
incorporation expressly identify “one or more specific public benefits to be
promoted by the corporation.”41 One of the most well-known benefit
corporations, Patagonia, promises in its certificate of incorporation that it
will provide these public benefits:
(1) Each year, this corporation shall contribute one-percent (1%)
of its annual net revenue to non-profit charitable organizations that
promote environmental conservation and sustainability . . . .
(2) . . . (b) designing and fabricating products . . . that are made
from materials that can be reused or recycled, (c) . . . with
minimum impacts throughout the supply-chain—including
resource extraction, manufacturing and transportation—on water
use, water quality, energy use, greenhouse gas emissions,
chemical use, toxicity and waste.42
Patagonia pursues the first benefit purposes by donating millions of
dollars to grassroots nonprofits that fight climate change, promote a future
PURSUING PROFIT WITH PURPOSE passim (2018); Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing
Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 19, passim (2014).
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2020).
38. Id. § 362, 365.
39. Id. § 362.
40. Id. § 362(a).
41. Id. § 362(a)(1).
42. Restated Articles of Incorporation of Patagonia, Inc., filed with State of Del., Sec’y
of State (Oct. 30, 2013), https://businesssearch.sos.ca.gov/Document/RetrievePDF?Id=0092
8053-17025484 [https://perma.cc/C9R3-N7GK].
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in sustainable energy, and protect public lands.43 It pursues the second by,
among other things, using 51% recycled or renewable materials, and
repairing over 100,000 garments every year to combat the throw away
culture.44
2. Statutorily Altering Director Fiduciary Duties
If benefit corporations are tasked with pursuing profit and purpose, then
it follows that director fiduciary duties must change—directors must do more
than focus on maximizing return to shareholders. The DBCL makes that
clear:
(a) The board of directors shall manage or direct the business and
affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances
the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of
those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the
specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate
of incorporation.
(b) A director of a public benefit corporation . . . with respect to a
decision implicating the balance requirement in subsection (a) of
this section, will be deemed to satisfy such director’s fiduciary
duties to stockholders and the corporation if such director’s
decision is both informed and disinterested and not such that no
person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve.45
Subsection (a) mandates that directors balance the impact of their
decision on stakeholders and shareholders.46 For a director, it is not enough
to be informed as to how her decision will financially impact shareholders
(the requirement of the traditional fiduciary duty of care), she must also
inform herself how the decision will impact those materially affected (i.e.,
stakeholders) .47
43. PATAGONIA, INC., ANNUAL BENEFIT CORPORATION REPORT 4-5 (2018) [hereinafter
PATAGONIA 2018 REPORT].
44. Id. at 6–9.
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365 (2020).
46. Id. § 365(a).
47. Some scholars characterize this as an expansion of fiduciary duties. See Rugger
Burke and Samuel P. Bragg, Sustainability in The Boardroom: Reconsidering Fiduciary Duty
Under Revlon in the Wake of Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
59, 75–76 (2014) (“This expansion of fiduciary duties is at the heart of what it means to be a
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However, confusion arises from the use of the word “balance”. It is
necessarily vague. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “balance” as “to
estimate the two aspects or sides of anything; to ponder.”48 This is a
procedure-based definition, and consistent with Subsection (b), which
requires that the director “inform” herself.49 (Interestingly, it is also
consistent with the traditional Delaware view of the fiduciary duty of care,
which is process—as opposed to outcome—oriented.)50
But does the statute require that the director do more than inform
herself? The Oxford English Dictionary also defines “balance” as “[t]o bring
to or keep in equilibrium.”51 This would seem to indicate that even the most
informed decision could run afoul of the statutory mandate if it alters the
equilibrium between shareholders and stakeholders.
Finally, the DBCL provides:
A director of a public benefit corporation shall not, by virtue of the
public benefit provisions or § 362(a) of this title, have any duty to
any person on account of any interest of such person in the public
benefit or public benefits identified in the certificate of
incorporation or on account of any interest materially affected by
the corporation’s conduct.52
As a practical matter, this means that any failure to comply with section
362(a), the balancing requirement, violates a fiduciary duty of care owed not
to the stakeholders, but instead, to the shareholders.53 It is the shareholders
that have standing to sue.54 To illustrate: if a board of directors of Patagonia
made a decision without considering the impact on its non-profit partners,
only a shareholder could bring the lawsuit claiming that the directors violated
their fiduciary duty of care.
benefit corporation.”).
48. “balance, v.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2019. Web. (last
visited Feb. 7, 2020).
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b)(2020).
50. See infra Part II (discussing that the duty of care is fulfilled by process, not outcome).
51. “balance, v.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2019. Web. (last
visited Feb. 7, 2020).
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b)(2020).
53. The drafters of the legislation rejected the idea that fiduciary duties should run
directly to stakeholders. For arguments in favor of such a dramatic shift, see Margaret M.
Blair and Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247,
288-289 (1999) (advocating a system where fiduciary duties run to the “team” as a whole);
John Gregory Scott Crespi, Redefining the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors in
Accordance with the Team Production Model of Corporate Governance, 36 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 623, 627 (2003) (“[F]iduciary duties in favor of shareholders should be . . . respecified
to run in favor of a larger class of stakeholders.”).
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 365(b), 367 (2020).
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The structure of the law is a good compromise. On the one hand,
shareholders—who presumably invested in the benefit corporation because
they believed in its mission—are granted standing to enforce that mission.55
On the other hand, stakeholders are not.56 A rule otherwise would be too
unwieldy. The Delaware courts would be inundated with derivative suits by
employees, suppliers, the local community, or even the environment.
3. Limited Reach
Benefit corporations offer an option to those that want to pursue profit
and purpose,57 without imposing a new paradigm upon traditional
corporations that are happily operating under the old rules. Benefit
corporations are a new entrant into the marketplace—which consists of
partnerships, LPs, LLPs, LLCs, corporations, and S-corporations—and
benefit corporations will rise or fall based on their ability to compete.
The thirty-six states that encourage the creation of benefit corporations
do so without risking the traditional corporate paradigm on which so much
of the American economy rests. As Louis Brandeis famously expounded,
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”58
Professor Kevin Tu, who has written extensively on benefit
corporations, points out that there is very little change to traditional
corporations as a result of the creation of benefit corporations.59 To my mind,
that is a good thing (along the lines of Brandeis’ laboratory of democracy
quote above).
However, Professor Tu raises two important, closely related points.
First, by enacting benefit corporation legislation, he argues, states are
reinforcing the idea that the traditional corporation exists to provide
pecuniary gain to shareholders. He points out “the rhetoric surrounding
Benefit Corporations may be overly simplified such that Benefit
55. Id. § 367.
56. Id.
57. Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An Economic Analysis
With Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 62 EMORY L.J. 999, 1006 (2013)
(“[T]he rise of the benefit corporation simply presents a much needed option for those who
wish to incorporate values-based decision making into their business practices and
procedures.”).
58. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
59. Tu, supra note 24, at 127 (“In the absence of additional action, traditional for-profit
corporations see little, if any, improvement from the addition of Benefit Corporations.”).
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Corporations are viewed as necessary because traditional for-profits prohibit
the consideration of broader stakeholder interests and the pursuit of a public
benefit. Accordingly, traditional for-profit corporations may be mistakenly
relegated to the pursuit of shareholder profit alone.”60 The problem with that
argument is, as Professor Tu hints, that the battle is already resolved in favor
of the shareholder wealth-maximization norm.61 (That is to say, to the extent
that the benefit corporation adds fuel to the wealth-maximization fire, that
fire was already blazing hot.)
Professor Tu’s follow-on argument flows from the previous and is
slightly more complicated. It consists of three assumptions followed by a
conclusion:
• if before benefit corporations, directors at traditional
corporations believed that their duty to maximize return for
shareholders was an open question (i.e., the law was unsettled
as to whether they could eschew shareholder wealth
maximization); and
• if before benefit corporations, directors relied on said
uncertainty as an opening to pursue philanthropy; and
• if benefit corporation legislation is an affirmative signal that
at traditional corporations the fiduciary duty of directors is to
maximize shareholder profit;
• then, following benefit corporation legislation, directors at
traditional corporations may forego philanthropy to mitigate
risk.62
I believe that there are simply too many “if” clauses to worry that the
rise of benefit corporations will discourage traditional corporations from
engaging in philanthropy. Second, as Professor Tu himself points out,
benefit corporation statutes include language to eliminate or diminish the
foregoing argument. The Model Benefit Corporation Law (MBCL)
provides:
The existence of a provision of this [chapter] shall not of itself
create an implication that a contrary or different rule of law is
applicable to a business corporation that is not a benefit
corporation. This [chapter] shall not affect a statute or rule of law
60. Tu, supra note 24, at 173; see J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation,
and Statutory Design, 26 REGENT U.L. REV. 143, 153 (2013-2014) (“[Benefit corporation
legislation] divid[es] corporations into two categories: benefit corporations that must act for
‘general public benefit’ and all other corporations that do not elect benefit corporation status
and impliedly must act only in ways that relate to shareholder profit maximization.”).
61. Tu, supra note 24, at 172–73.
62. Tu, supra note 24, at 174–75.
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that is applicable to a business corporation that is not a benefit
corporation.63
As I have written elsewhere, traditional corporations are allowed to
engage in philanthropy. Courts are not “concerned that some of [a
corporation’s] cash surplus [is] going to charity.”64 However, a court will
intervene when a controlling shareholder, or the board of directors,
“attempt[s] to change the very purpose of the corporation from benefiting
investors to benefiting the public.”65
B. Federal Benefit Corporations
Unlike the DBCL (or the MBCL), Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable
Capitalism Act (ACA) is mandatory.66 That is, accountable corporation
status is imposed on all large entities.67 Large corporations must obtain a
charter from the newly created Office of United States Corporations.68 (For
ease of discussion, this Article will distinguish between state and federal
benefit corporations by referring to the latter as “accountable corporations”.)
The rest of the ACA’s structure69 is modeled on state benefit
corporation legislation (of which the DBCL is one example).70 Like the
DBCL, the ACA mandates that an accountable corporation “have the
purpose of creating a general public benefit,” defined as “a material positive
impact on society resulting from [its] business and operations . . . when taken
as a whole.”71

63. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 101(b) (2014). The DBCL provides a similar
provision, “[t]his subchapter shall not affect a statute or rule of law that is applicable to a
corporation that is not a public benefit corporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 368 (2020).
64. Brent J. Horton, Rising to Their Full Potential: How a Uniform Disclosure Regime
Will Empower Benefit Corporations, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 116 (2019).
65. Id.
66. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 4 (2018).
67. The ACA defines a large entity as any corporation or LLC that engages in interstate
commerce with greater than $1 billion gross receipts per year. Accountable Capitalism Act,
S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 2(2)(A) (2018).
68. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018).
69. I am not including in this discussion provisions of the ACA that are not included in
state benefit corporation legislation. If those provisions are included, one could argue that the
ACA goes much farther than state benefit corporation legislation. For example, the ACA
requires employees to be represented on the board of directors, limits executive compensation,
and limits political spending by corporations. ACA One-Pager, supra note 8. These matters
are beyond the scope of this Article.
70. ACA One-Pager, supra note 8 (explaining that the ACA is modeled on state benefit
corporation legislation).
71. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5(b)(2), § 5(a)(1) (2018).
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Like the DBCL, the ACA requires directors to balance the interests of
shareholders and stakeholders.72 Directors will be required to “balance[] the
pecuniary interests of the shareholders . . . with the best interests of persons
that are materially affected by the conduct of the United States
corporation.”73
Indeed, Senator Warren explains that the ACA’s “approach is derived
from the thriving benefit corporation model that 33 [now 36] states and the
District of Columbia have adopted and that companies like Patagonia,
Danone North America, and Kickstarter have embraced with strong
results.”74 In short, the approach to entire fairness review advocated in this
Article applies equally well to Benefit Corporations and Accountable
Corporations.
II. ENTIRE FAIRNESS APPLIED TO TRADITIONAL CORPORATIONS
This Part starts with the basics of fiduciary duties and the business
judgment rule. It then moves on to discussing the entire fairness standard of
review—distilling the essential elements. Part III will then explain how
those elements can be applied in the benefit corporation context.
A. Fiduciary Duty Basics
In Delaware, director fiduciary duties are divided into the duty of
loyalty and the duty of care.75 The duty of loyalty requires, by way of
example, that directors not misappropriate corporate opportunities76 or
compete with the corporation.77 It requires no further elucidation here.
The duty of care requires directors to make decisions “us[ing] that
amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in
72. Id. § 5(c)(1).
73. Id.
74. ACA One-Pager, supra note 8.
75. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d,
Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 40 (Del. 2006).
76. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939) (“[I]f there is presented to a corporate
officer or director a business opportunity which the corporation is financially able to
undertake, is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation’s business and is of practical
advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy,
and, by embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or director will be brought
into conflict with that of his corporation, the law will not permit him to seize the opportunity
for himself.”).
77. Thorpe by Castleman v. CERBCO, 676 A.2d 436, 442 (Del. 1996) (“[It is a]
fundamental proposition of the [fiduciary duty of loyalty] that directors may not compete with
the corporation.”).
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similar circumstances.”78 While the use of the word “care” sounds like a
standard against which the substance of the directors’ decision can be
measured (i.e., is it in line with what a reasonable director would decide?); it
is not.79 The use of the word “care” is with regard to the process the directors
employed to make the decision.80 Generally speaking, a careful process is
one that is informed81 and not rushed.82
B. The Business Judgment Rule
Adding a layer of complexity to the foregoing—at least the portion
regarding the fiduciary duty of care83—is the business judgment rule.
78. Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 749.
79. Some states’ courts examine whether the substance of the decision itself is “grossly
negligent.” Delaware courts do not. The court explained in Brehm v. Eisner that Delaware
courts do not care about the substance of the decision itself, but instead about the process by
which the decision is reached. 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). The most important part of
that process is the board informing itself. Id. The court stated:
As for the plaintiffs’ contention that the directors failed to exercise “substantive
due care,” we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment
rule. [Delaware] courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments.
We do not even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the
decision-making context is process due care only.
Id.

80. Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment
Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 425 (2013) (discussing that the standard
of care requires that the board follow a procedure).
81. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (stating that there is a
breach of duty of care where directors are not informed). It should be noted that the process
of becoming informed is more than a “check-the-box” exercise. “[T]he duty of care . . .
requires more than passive acceptance of information presented to the board; instead, directors
must proceed with a “critical eye” in assessing information in order to protect the interests of
the corporation and its stockholders.” William M. Lafferty, Lisa A. Schmidt & Donald J.
Wolfe, Jr., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under Delaware Law,
116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 837, 842 (2012); but see Stephen J. Lubben & Alana J. Darnell,
Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589, 591 (2006) (“[It] requires little more of a
director than a ritualistic consideration of relevant data. [And that] after the director engages
in this ritual, her decision will not violate the duty. In short, the classic duty of care no longer
exists in Delaware.”).
82. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 869 (finding a breach of duty of care where board made
decision to merge in under two hours).
83.
In Delaware, the two standards have been joined by innovations that are—or, at
least, originally were—fairly unorthodox. All claims of breach of fiduciary duty
initially are protected by the presumption of the business judgment rule. If a
plaintiff can establish a breach of fiduciary duty, whether the duty of loyalty or
the duty of care, then the entire fairness test is invoked.
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The business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business
decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
the company.”84 (Thus, as will be discussed below, the first way to overcome
the business judgment presumption is to show that the board of directors was
not informed.85)
Where a plaintiff claims that a board of directors violated their fiduciary
duty of care, the business judgment rule makes it very difficult to prevail.86
(That is why it is essential for a plaintiff to allege facts that overcome the
business judgment rule, and trigger entire fairness review, as discussed
below.) Illustrating the foregoing point is Brehm v. Eisner.87 In Brehm, the
plaintiff challenged the Disney board of director’s decision to pay luxurious
compensation in cash and stock options to a new president, Michael Ovitz.88
The board did so despite Ovitz questionable qualifications and value to
Disney.89 What was worse, the employment agreement provided for a golden
parachute that actually incentivized Ovitz to leave, because he could make
more money leaving—assuming he did so on a no fault basis—than if he
fulfilled his contract.90
The court in Brehm stated that the board of directors decision was “very
troubling case on the merits” and that “the compensation and termination
payout for Ovitz were exceedingly lucrative, if not luxurious, compared to
Ovitz’ value to the Company.”91 Yet, the court refused to hold the directors
liable for violating the fiduciary duty of care. It held that the business
judgment rule prohibited it from “measure[ing], weigh[ing] or quantify[ing]
directors’ judgments.”92 This echoed the statement by the court of Chancery
in the proceedings below:
[The fact that a judge] believes a decision substantively wrong, or
Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 821,
823 (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636
A.2d 956 (Del. 1994)).
84. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
85. See infra Part II.C.
86. The practical effect of the business judgment rule is that courts will abstain from
second guessing management decisions. In Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
Professor Bainbridge explains that the business judgment rule is “a doctrine of abstention
pursuant to which courts . . . refrain from reviewing board decisions.” Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004).
87. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
88. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 251.
91. Id. at 249.
92. Id. at 264.
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degrees of wrong extending through “stupid” to “egregious” or
“irrational”, provides no ground for director liability. . . . To
employ a different rule — one that permitted an “objective”
evaluation of the decision — would expose directors to substantive
second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries, which would, in
the long-run, be injurious to investor interests.93
Certainly, Brehm illustrates how the business judgment rule can in
certain circumstances lead to a bad result.94 However, the court should be
applauded for resisting the temptation to let bad facts lead to bad law.
Indeed, there are sound policy reasons for not second-guessing business
decisions made by a board of directors. The first two are (1) encouraging
persons to serve as directors,95 and (2) encouraging risk taking by directors.96
These recognize that it is good policy to protect directors from personal
liability for good faith business decisions (even though, with the benefit of
hindsight, they are now viewed as bad decisions). Holding directors liable
for good faith business decisions discourages them from agreeing to serve as
directors, or if they do agree to serve, renders them much too cautious in their
decision making.97
Further policy considerations weighing in favor of the business
judgment rule include: (3) judges are not business experts and thus not in a
position to challenge the substantive decision of directors (but judges, as

93. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citing
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967).
94. Nor is business judgment deference limited to operational decisions. It applies to
decisions to merge, acquire or be acquired as well. The court in Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time, Inc., reviewed Time board’s original decision to enter into a merger agreement
with Warner Brothers using the business judgment standard. 571 A.2d 1140, 1151-52 (Del.
1989); see Mary Siegel, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 599, 606 (2013) (discussing the application of business judgment standard in Paramount
v. Time). Fourteen years later, the case of Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., involved
a challenge to the merger of NCS and Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. 818 A.2d 914, 931 (Del.
2003). Again, the court refused to second guess the decision of the NCS board, citing with
approval its earlier decision, stating, “in Paramount v. Time, we held that the business
judgment rule applied to the Time board’s original decision to merge with Warner.”
Omnicare, 818 A.2d. at 931; see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Doctrines and Markets: Premiums
in Stock-For-Stock Mergers and Some Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary Duties,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 881, 903 (2003) (“In Omnicare, the court determined that deal protection
measures triggered enhanced scrutiny, despite its assumption that the business
judgment rule applied to the directors’ decision to approve the merger itself.”).
95. Todd M. Aman, Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Judgment Rule: A Critique in
Light of the Financial Meltdown, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010/2011).
96. Bainbridge, supra note 86, at 110.
97. Aman, supra note 95, at 12; Bainbridge, supra note 86, at 110.
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lawyers, are in a good position to review process),98 and (4) judicial
economy, that is, “the business judgment rule . . . foster[s] both business and
judicial economy by not allowing every corporate transaction to be subject
to judicial review at the request of a disagreeing stockholder.”99 The third
and fourth recognize the limitations of judges, both in terms of expertise and
time.
C. Overcoming the Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is a presumption. As has been hinted at
above, that presumption can be overcome in two ways:
• One element of the presumption is proved false. A
shareholder plaintiff can show that one of the elements of
the business judgment presumption is false, i.e., that the
board was informed (it really wasn’t),100 or that the board
acted in good faith (it really didn’t).101
• It is really a duty of loyalty issue.102 A shareholder plaintiff
can show that the facts implicate the fiduciary duty of
loyalty, either because (a) there was a controlling
shareholder with an interest in the transaction,103 or (b) a
majority of the board has a personal interest in the
transaction.104
The above exceptions to the business judgment rule share one thing in
common—each is an example of a situation where the board cannot be said
98. After all, it is those directors that are tasked by the shareholders with running the
corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2020) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors.”).
99. S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 95
(1979).
100. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (finding the board
uninformed).
101. See Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 174 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8,
2005) (stating that business judgment does not protect a decision made in bad faith).
102. “The category of transactions that require judicial review pursuant to the entire
fairness standard ab initio do so because, by definition, the inherently interested nature of
those transactions are inextricably intertwined with issues of loyalty.” Emerald Partners v.
Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 93 (Del. 2001) (citing Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638
A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994).
103. As was the case in Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del. 1983).
104. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del. Ch. 2013) (finding no
controlling shareholder, but board interested in the transaction); In re PNB Holding Co.
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 28-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at *40 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006)
(applying entire fairness where board conflicted by self-interest).
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to be properly functioning, and as such, its decision is likely flawed. In such
case, the decision is not entitled to deference from the court.
In the first case—where the board was not informed—then it is arguable
that a business decision was never made in the first place. Consider that a
business decision has three steps: (1) the intelligence step—finding
conditions calling for a decision; (2) the design step—inventing, developing,
and analyzing possible courses of action; and (3) the choice step—selecting
a course of action.105 Each of those three steps are information dependent;
without information, the steps cannot be followed.
As to the second case—where there is a controlling shareholder—the
board members may fear retaliation if they do not approve the transaction
(especially where some of them may be employed by the controller).
Shareholders too may feel pressure.106 “[S]hareholders voting on a parent
subsidiary merger might perceive that their disapproval could risk retaliation
of some kind by the controlling stockholder. For example, the controlling
stockholder might decide to stop dividend payments or to effect a subsequent
cash out merger at a less favorable price.”107
In either case, deference to the board of directors is not justified. The
court can never be confident that the price agreed to by the board was truly
the highest price that the market would bear.108
If the plaintiff shareholder is successful in overcoming the business
judgment presumption, the court will be required to review the challenged
decision using the entire fairness standard.109
D. Entire Fairness Basics
When the entire fairness standard applies, the court will not defer to the
decision of the board of directors.110 The posture of the court shifts from
deferential to searching.111 It scrutinizes (1) the process the board used to
105. Earnest R. Archer, How to Make a Business Decision: An Analysis of Theory and
Practice, 69 MGMT. REV. 54, 55 (1980) (explaining the work of Nobel Laureate Herbert A.
Simon).
106. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116-17 (Del. 1994)
(quoting Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (1990)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. For an excellent analysis of when entire fairness is triggered, Robert B. Little &
Joseph A. Orien, Determining the Likely Standard of Review in Delaware M&A Transactions,
HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG., Apr. 28, 2017, https://corpgov.law.harvard
.edu/2017/04/28/determining-the-likely-standard-of-review-in-delaware-ma-transactions-2/
[https://perma.cc/ST7B-BFCG].
110. Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 710–11 (Del. 1983).
111. Id.
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reach its decision (was it aimed at achieving a fair price for shareholders?),
and (2) the substance of the decision itself (was a fair price achieved?).112
More specifically, as to process, the court will examine the timing of
the decision (was the decision was rushed?), the information available to the
directors, and the negotiation process.113 As to substance, the court will focus
on the price obtained.114 In the merger and acquisitions context, the court
will ask whether the board of directors obtained the highest price the market
will permit for the shareholders’ stock.115
Finally, while the test has two parts, it is not bifurcated.116 Both aspects
must be examined as a whole (consider: a fair process leads to, and makes
more likely, a fair price).117 Be that as it may, courts “recognize that price
may be the preponderant consideration outweighing other features of the
merger.”118
E. Applying Entire Fairness to Decisions to Merge, Acquire or Be
Acquired at Traditional Corporations
Below, this Article will examine several important Delaware decisions
applying entire fairness to board decisions to merge, acquire or be acquired.
These include: Weinberger v. UOP, which explains why entire fairness (as
opposed to business judgment) must be used to review transactions involving
a controlling shareholder;119 Kahn v. Lynch, which expands on Weinberger
by discussing burden of proof issues when entire fairness is applied to
transactions involving a controlling shareholder;120 Kahn v M&F Worldwide,
which provides a process to avoid Weinberger entire fairness review (called
the MFW framework);121 and In Re Trados, which illustrates the important
112. Id. at 710–15.
113. Id. at 711.
114. Id. at 712.
115. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 15, at 874–75.
116. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
117. Id.; Monroe County Emp. Retire. Sys. v. Carlson, No. 4587-CC, 2010 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 132, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 7, 2010) (“Quite frankly, Delaware law focuses on fair
dealing in controlling shareholder transactions primarily because a fair price is more likely to
follow fair dealing. Fair price, however, is often the paramount consideration.”); Valeant
Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 748 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The court’s finding that
[defendants] used an unfair process to authorize the bonuses does not end the court’s inquiry
because it is possible that the pricing terms were so fair as to render the transaction entirely
fair.”).
118. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
119. Id.
120. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994).
121. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. Mar. 14, 2014).
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point that entire fairness is not limited to transactions involving a controlling
shareholder.122
1. The Starting Point—Weinberger v. UOP
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. involved a cash out merger of UOP, Inc. into
Signal Companies, Inc.123 The story began in 1975 when Signal become the
majority owner of UOP, acquiring 50.5% of its shares at $21 per share (this
represented a substantial premium over UOP’s trading price of $14 per
share).124
Signal became interested in buying the remainder of UOP’s shares in
1978.125 Signal tasked two of its directors, Arledge and Chitea, with
preparing a feasibility study regarding purchasing all remaining shares of
UOP.126 Arledge and Chitea were perfect for the task because they were
also directors of UOP—having been placed there by Signal—and thus had
access to UOP’s financial information.127 They concluded that a purchase
price of up to $24 per share would be a “good investment.”128
Signal kept the existence of the feasibility study secret from UOP.129
On February 28, 1978, Signal approached UOP’s President, James
Crawford, about the possibility of the merger at $20 to $21 per share.130
Crawford responded that he was supportive of the idea (while $21 per share
was below the “good” purchase price of up to $24 per share, all that Crawford
knew was that it represented a substantial premium over the market price).131
Crawford did not suggest that Signal should pay more for UOP.132
At that point, at the insistence of Signal, Crawford began to move very
quickly.133 Over the next four business days, Crawford was able to (1)
ascertain that UOP’s board was interested in the merger,134 and (2) obtain a
rushed fairness opinion from Lehman Brothers (the fairness opinion
concluded that $21 was a fair price).135
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 21 (Del. Ch. 2013).
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 705.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 705, 707.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 705.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 707.
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On March 6, Signal’s board met, having heard from Crawford that
UOP’s board was interested.136 At that point, Signal’s board voted to
authorize an offer of $21 per share.137
That same day, UOP’s board met.138 UOP’s board considered the offer
of $21 per share.139 They measured the offer against the company’s financial
data for the past three years, market price information, budget projections,
as well as the hastily prepared Lehman Brothers fairness opinion.140 They
did not have—indeed, did not know it existed—the feasibility study prepared
by Arledge and Chitea opining that $24 per share was a “good” price.141
Further, Arledge and Chitea (who were also Signal directors)
participated in the deliberations without disclosing the existence of the
report.142 The UOP board adopted the proposal with Arledge, Chitea and two
other signal-affiliated board members abstaining.143 While the Delaware
Supreme Court decision is ambiguous on the matter, the decision of the
Chancery Court makes clear that all the non-Signal directors voted in favor
of the merger (and that all conflicted directors would have voted in favor,
had they not abstained).144
Interestingly, the shareholders would not vote until May 26, 1978.145
(This calls into question why the Signal board decision and the Lehman
Brothers fairness opinion needed to be rushed.) When the shareholders did
vote, 51.9% of the minority voted for the merger, 4.5% voted against, and
the remainder did not vote.146

136. Id.
137. Id. The offer also required that it be approved by a majority of the minority of UOP’s
shareholders.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. There is actually some disagreement here, but the court ultimately found they did
not have access to the feasibility study:
Signal also suggests that the Arledge-Chitiea feasibility study, indicating that a
price of up to $24 per share would be a “good investment” for Signal, was
discussed at the UOP directors’ meeting. The Chancellor made no such finding,
and our independent review of the record . . . satisfies us by a preponderance of
the evidence that there was no discussion of this document at UOP’s board
meeting.
Id.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1340 (Del. Ch. 1981).
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 708.
Id.
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Thus, the merger was approved.147 Each minority share was converted
to a right to receive $21 cash.148 This was immediately challenged by several
minority shareholders who believed $21 was less than a fair price for their
shares.149
a. The Decision to Apply Entire Fairness
A court will use entire fairness review if (a) there is an interested
shareholder controlling the board,150 or (b) the board is itself interested in the
transaction.151
Here, the argument that entire fairness should apply was fairly strong,
as both grounds were met: UOP was a controlling shareholder of Signal, with
50.5% of the shares; further, five UOP employees served on the Signal Board
of Directors.152 While the first point was certainly not lost on the court (and
by itself would be sufficient to require entire fairness review), the court
focused on the second point:
Signal cannot escape the effects of the conflicts it faced,
particularly when its designees on UOP’s board did not totally
abstain from participation in the matter. There is no “safe harbor”
for such divided loyalties in Delaware. When directors of a
Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are
required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most
scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain. The requirement of
fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both
sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire
fairness. . . .153
The court went on to state that “[entire] fairness has two basic aspects:
fair dealing and fair price,” and discussed each in turn.154
b. Fair Dealing
Turning to fair dealing, the court emphasized candor.155 The court was
especially bothered by the fact that Signal hid from UOP the feasibility study
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 714–15.
Id.
In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del. Ch. 2013).
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710–11.
Id. at 710 (citation omitted).
Id. at 711.
Id.
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prepared by Arledge and Chitea.156 This prevented the UOP board from
being able to deliberate with all information.157 It also tainted the approval
of the UOP shareholders.158
Second, Crawford made no effort to negotiate the price higher.159 He
simply accepted that $21 was fair.160
Third, the court was bothered by the fact that Signal rushed UOP to
approve the merger in just four business days, including preparation of the
fairness opinion by Lehman Brothers (and for that reason, the fairness
opinion was largely disregarded by the court).161 This is exacerbated by the
fact that there was no business purpose for the rush.162 In fact, the UOP board
approved the merger on March 6, but the shareholders did not vote until May
26, over two months later.163
c. Fair Price
Here, much of the court’s decision was focused on whether fair price
must be shown by the “Delaware block” or weighted average method.164 The
Chancellor below had used the fact that plaintiff did not use the Delaware
block method to reject their argument that the fair price was $26 per share.165
Instead, the Plaintiff’s expert had used a comparative analysis (to the price
achieved in ten other tender offer-merger combinations) as well as a
discounted cash flow analysis.166
The court found that it was improper for the Chancery Court to reject
Plaintiff’s valuation, holding: “We believe that a more liberal approach must
include proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally
considered acceptable in the financial community . . . .”167 Certainly, the
discounted cash flow analysis used by the Plaintiff’s expert fits within the

156. Id. at 712.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 711.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 712.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 708.
164. Id. at 712. The Delaware Block Method “involves separate calculations of market
value, earnings value and asset value, then multiplication of each valuation by weights chosen
by the appraiser to reach a final fair value.” Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal
Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 842 (1984).
165. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 713.
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definition of generally accepted techniques and methods.168
The court did not suggest a monetary result, but directed that on
remand, the court of Chancery should consider the Plaintiff’s valuation.169
As such, the case was remanded to the Chancery Court below for a
determination of fair price.170
d. On Remand
Interestingly, while the Chancery Court recognized that the Supreme
Court of Delaware directed it to consider the valuation that had been
provided by the Plaintiff’s expert, it stated that it had already done so
(“actually, I thought that I had made it clear that I had considered it before
and rejected it as being unpersuasive on its merits”).171 It further stated that:
Having reconsidered the plaintiff’s evidence, I find that my
reaction to it now is no different than it was earlier. If anything, I
feel that my earlier decision to reject the plaintiff’s discounted cash
flow analysis as a method for placing a value on a share of UOP
stock has been solidified. . . .172
Nevertheless, the Chancery Court did state that it was proper to
compensate the minority shareholders in some way for the wrong perpetrated
against them.173 It decided that “$1 per share represents a fair measure of
compensation for the wrong done to the members of the minority.”174 It used
the testimony of the Defendant’s expert to do so:
[Defendant’s expert] indicated that based upon information
available as of the time of the merger he could have issued an
opinion . . . that a price within the range of $20 - $22 would have
been fair to the UOP minority. He further acknowledged that if a
date 30 days prior to the announcement of the transaction was used
as the date to measure the premium in his list of comparable
transactions, the median and average premium reflected by such
comparables would be in the vicinity of 50% or more. A 50%plus premium applied against the market price of the UOP shares
on the day prior to the announcement of the proposed merger
would indicate that a price of $22 per share would not have been
168. Id. at 714.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 715.
171. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 5642, 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 378, at *19–20 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 30, 1985).
172. Id. at *20–21.
173. Id. at *30.
174. Id. at *29–30.
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out of line for the acquisition of the 49.5% minority interest of
UOP.175
The plaintiffs again appealed the decision of the Chancery Court. This
time the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed.176
2. Shifting the Burden—Kahn v. Lynch
Another controlling shareholder case is Kahn v. Lynch Communication
Systems.177 Lynch manufactured telecommunications equipment.178 In 1986,
Lynch was acquired in a tender offer and cash out merger by its largest
shareholder, Alcatel U.S.A. Corporation.179 A cashed out shareholder
brought an action claiming that the price paid—$15.50—was too low.
Despite the fact that Alcatel only held 43.3% of Lynch, the court found
that Alcatel was a controlling shareholder, and reviewed the transaction
using the entire fairness standard.180
Importantly, the court stated that rather than placing the burden on
Alcatel to prove entire fairness, if there was a properly functioning special
committee, the burden would shift to the plaintiff to show that the transaction
was not entirely fair.181 More precisely, the court held that:
[I]n “entire fairness” cases, the defendants may shift the burden of
persuasion to the plaintiff if either (1) they show that the
transaction was approved by a well-functioning committee of
independent directors; or (2) they show that the transaction was
approved by an informed vote of a majority of the minority
stockholders.182
175. Id. at *29–30.
176. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 497 A.2d 792 (Del. 1985).
177. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110–11 (Del. Apr. 5, 1994).
178. Id. at 1112.
179. Id. at 1112–13. Alcatel had purchased 30.6% of Lynch in 1981 and increased its
holding to 43.3% in 1986. Id. at 1112.
180. The court rejected Alcatel’s argument that the decision of the board should be
reviewed under the more deferential business judgment rule, because it was only a 43.3%
shareholder. Id. at 1112–15. The court focused on agreements that gave Alcatel veto power
over whether Lynch could be sold. Id. at 1114. These agreements, the court reasoned, meant
that Alcatel exercised de facto control over Lynch’s business affairs, specifically in the area
at issue, mergers and acquisitions. Id. at 1115. In fact, Alcatel had a history of using its
position of dominance to prevent Lynch from making acquisitions that would be good for
Lynch, but bad for Alcatel. Id. at 1118. Prior to the transaction in question, Alcatel had
blocked Lynch from purchasing Telco Systems, Inc. (because Telco was a competitor of
Celwave Systems, Inc., an affiliate of Alcatel). Id. at 1112–13.
181. Id. at 1117.
182. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. Mar. 14, 2014) (citing
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Alcatel argued that the burden should shift to the plaintiff, because of
the use of a special committee.183 However, the court held that for the burden
to properly shift, the special committee must be independent with the power
to say no.184 Here, the special committee lacked the power to say no.185
Alcatel coerced the special committee into accepting an offer of $15.50 using
threats.186 Alcatel told the special committee that if it did not approve the
deal it would commence a hostile takeover at a lower price.187 The court
likened the situation to a prior case, American General, where the special
committee was issued an ultimatum—accept or we (the majority
shareholder) will proceed without your input.188
As such, the Supreme Court of Delaware remanded to the Court of
Chancery—which had improperly placed the burden on the Plaintiff,
Kahn—to take a fresh look at the issue of entire fairness, this time with the
burden on Defendant, Alcatel.189
Upon remand, the Court of Chancery stated, “I am satisfied that the
Supreme Court did not intend to foreclose a finding of entire fairness after
remand,” despite the fact that it had found “the independent committee had
been coerced into accepting Alcatel’s final offer by the ‘explicit threat that
Alcatel was “ready to proceed with a hostile bid.””190 Indeed, upon remand,
despite coercion (and the burden being on Defendant, Alcatel), the Court of
Chancery held that the transaction was entirely fair based upon (1) other
aspects of the procedure employed mitigated the fact the special committee
was coerced, and (2) the ultimate price paid was fair.191
One factor considered in determining fair dealing is how the approval
of the directors was obtained.192 This factor weighed in favor of plaintiffs,
given the coercion already discussed. However, the court found—
unpersuasively in my opinion—that the other factors weighed in favor of
Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117).
183. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1115.
184. Id. at 1119–20.
185. Id. at 1120.
186. Id. The court also noted that in prior dealings between the independent committee
and Alcatel, “the non-Alcatel [independent] directors deferred to Alcatel because of its
position as a significant stockholder and not because they decided in the exercise of their own
business judgment that Alcatel’s position was correct.” Id. at 1115.
187. Id. at 1119–20.
188. Id. at 1120 (quoting American Gen. Corp. v. Texas Air Corp., No. 8390, 1987 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 382, at *12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1987)).
189. Id. at 1121–22.
190. Kahn v. Lynch Comm. Sys., No. 8748, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 44, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr.
17, 1995) (quoting Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1121 (Del. Supr. 1994)).
191. Id. at *4–6.
192. Id. at *4.
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defendant.193 These other factors, set out in Weinberger, include how the
deal was initiated, structured, negotiated, and disclosed.194 For example, as
to how the deal was initiated, the court found that the merger was in response
to Lynch’s need for a partner with fiber optic technology (but ignores the
fact that it was Alcatel that prevented Lynch from obtaining that technology
in the past).195
Turning to price, the Court of Chancery likewise found that it was
fair.196 It credited defendant’s expert more than the plaintiff’s.197 The
defendant’s expert had used a comparable sale premium to determine that a
price of $15.50-16.00 was fair.198 It stated of the former, “defendants’ expert,
explained the valuation analysis . . . and the basis for his conclusion that
$15.50 was more than a fair price. I find [his] testimony persuasive.”199 As
to the plaintiffs’ expert, the court summarily dismissed it as flawed.200
On the second appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed
dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ action.201
3. Avoiding Entire Fairness Altogether—Kahn v. M&F Worldwide
In cases involving controlling shareholders, there are times when the
process is so fair—i.e., the transaction is preconditioned on the approval of
a properly functioning special committee and a majority of the minority
shareholder vote—that the court will return to applying the business
judgment rule.202 This is referred to as the MFW framework, in reference to
the target company, MFW, in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.203 That case

193. Id. at *4–5.
194. Id. at *3–4 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (1983)).
195. Id. at *4.
196. Id. at *5.
197. Id. at *5–6.
198. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., No. 8748, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, at *19 (Del. Ch.
July 9, 1993) (“[U]sing the closing market price of $ 11.00 per share on October 17, 1986,
and adding a merger premium of 41-46%.”).
199. Lynch, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 44, at *6.
200. Id. at *5. The original decision stated that plaintiff’s expert testified that the fair price
for Lynch was $18.25, arrived at by “averaging market price, book value, earning power and
capitalization.” Lynch, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, at *13-14. The court was concerned that
the average of the first three led to a valuation of $14.80, which was—unfortunately for
plaintiffs—below the eventually agreed upon price of $15.50 per share. Id. It was only after
the plaintiff’s expert included capitalization—using a capitalization ratio that the court found
unpersuasive—that the valuation miraculously jumped to $18.25. Id.
201. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 669 A.2d 79, 86 (Del. 1995).
202. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. Mar. 14, 2014).
203. Id. at 638.
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involved a going private merger instigated by a controlling shareholder.204
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (“M&F”) was the controlling
stockholder in M&F Worldwide Corp. (MFW).205 M&F sought to purchase
the remaining shares of MFW and take the company private.206
M&F sent a proposal to MFW to purchase the remaining shares at $24
(a 50% premium over the then trading share price), with the proviso that
M&F would not move forward with the transaction unless MFW formed an
independent special committee to recommend the sale, and that the sale was
approved by a non-waivable majority of the minority vote (minority shares
being defined as “shares of the Company not owned by M&F or its
affiliates”).207
The board of MFW was interested in moving forward with the
transaction and formed a special committee.208 Each member of the special
committee was truly independent.209 (The court rejected arguments that prior
business dealings, removed from the present matter, negated said
independence.)210 After eight meetings, spanning several months, the special
committee, “although empowered to say ‘no,’ instead unanimously approved
and agreed to recommend the merger at a price of $25 per share.”211
The merger was thereafter approved by 65% of MFW’s minority
shareholders.212 Here, there was little for the court to discuss, because “the
plaintiffs themselves do not dispute that the majority-of-the-minority vote
was fully informed and uncoerced, because they fail to allege any failure of

204. Id. Despite the fact that M&F was only a 43% shareholder, the matter was treated as
a controlling shareholder transaction. While the decision does not state the reason, it is clear
from the complaint in the matter. It alleges, among other facts evidencing control, that:
M&F . . . is the controlling shareholder of MFW. . . . M&F and MFW share the
same address as their corporate headquarters; [s]ince 2005, [M&F] has provided
the services of [MFW’s] CEO and Chief Financial Officer. . . . M&F employs
each of the executive officers of MFW and supplies them to MFW through the
management services agreement . . . ; Perelman [owner of M&F] has been a
director of [MFW] since 1995 and has been Chairman of the Board of the
Company from 1995 to 1997 and since September 2007.
Complaint, In re MFW S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6566-CS (Del. Ch., Sept. 15, 2011),
available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/8829-a [https://perma.cc/8VTJ-SZ7S].
205. M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 638–40.
206. Id. at 640–41.
207. Id. at 640.
208. Id. at 641.
209. Id. at 650.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 652–653.
212. Id. at 654.
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disclosure or any act of coercion.”213
The Delaware Supreme Court provided what has become known as the
MFW framework:
[B]usiness judgment is the standard of review that should govern
mergers between a controlling stockholder and its corporate
subsidiary, where the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both
the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special
Committee that fulfills its duty of care; and the uncoerced,
informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.214
In so finding, Kahn v. M&F Worldwide answered a question that had
been left open in Kahn v. Lynch: if one protection is used (special committee
or majority of the minority vote) then the burden shifts to the plaintiff; what
happens if both protections are used (special committee and majority of the
minority vote)?215 In short, the possibility of coercion is greatly reduced
when such structures are in place.216 The independent board need not worry
about repercussions should they not recommend the transaction, because
they have no attachment to the controller.217 An independent committee with
the power to say no—to reject the deal if they are not offered the best price
the market will bear—is a powerful agent in favor of the shareholders.218
Minority shareholders do not need to worry that they will be left behind
by the majority, so they too have the power to say no.219 When uncoerced,
the shareholders are free to insist on the highest price the market will bear.220
4. Non-Controlling Shareholder Transactions—In re Trados
Before moving on, it is important to point out that there does not need
to be a controlling shareholder for entire fairness to apply to decisions to
merge, acquire or be acquired. Entire fairness applies when the board itself
in interested (personal financial benefit) in the outcome of the transaction.221
In In re Trados Inc., the Plaintiff shareholder claimed that the board
violated its fiduciary duties when it approved a sale of Trados to SDL, PLC
213. Id.
214. Id. at 644. The court points out that the special committee must be (1) independent,
(2) empowered to freely select its own advisors and to say no definitively, and (3) meet its
duty of care in negotiating a fair price. Id. at 645.
215. Id. at 642 (Del. Mar. 14, 2014) (citing Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117).
216. Id. at 654.
217. Id. at 650.
218. Id. at 644.
219. Id. at 654.
220. Id.
221. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 44–45 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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in 2005.222 This case is unlike Weinberger, Lynch and M&F Worldwide
because it did not involve a controlling shareholder.223 Instead, the board
was conflicted because of a management incentive plan (MIP) that rewarded
the directors for selling Trados to another company, even if the sale resulted
in no return for the common shareholders.224
The MIP was implemented at the insistence of venture capitalists (Hg
Capital, Sequoia, Wachovia, and others) that had purchased preferred shares
in Trados as far back as 2000 and now, five years later, were looking for an
opportunity to exit, preferably through the sale of Trados.225
The transaction in question was the sale of Trados to SDL for $60
million.226 To understand why the MIP caused a conflict of interest on the
part of the directors, one must understand how it impacted the proceeds of
the sale. Compare:
• Absent the MIP, the proceeds of the sale would go first to
Trados’ preferred shareholders (who held a liquidation
preference) and then to the common shareholders: $57.9
million to the preferred, with the remaining $2.1 million to
the common.227
• With the MIP, the proceeds of the sale would go first to
Trados’ management,228 then to preferred shareholders and
then to the common shareholders: $7.8 million to
management, followed by $52.2 million to the preferred,
with nothing remaining for the common.229
Because the directors were interested in the transaction (not because
there was a controlling shareholder, there was not), the court reviewed the
transaction using the entire fairness standard of review.230 As to fair dealing,
the court looked to how the transaction was initiated to benefit the preferred
222. Id. at 20.
223. Id.
224. Id. (applying entire fairness because the board was conflicted). Here, I am focusing
on the MIP for ease of explanation. However, there were actually many conflicts: two
directors were also members of management and received compensation under the MIP.
Three more were conflicted because they worked for corporations (Hg Capital, Sequoia,
Wachovia, et al) that held preferred shares in Trados, and thus would benefit from the
liquidation preference. One more director owned preferred shares individually and was
conflicted for that reason. Id. at 45–48.
225. Id. at 20.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 20, 59–60.
228. However, the MIP allowed management to take a percentage off the top, scaled,
depending on the sale proceeds (it worked out to 13%). Id. at 59.
229. Id. at 60.
230. Id. at 44–45.
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shareholders, and the negotiations were for the sole benefit of the preferred
shareholders.231 The transaction was initiated to benefit the preferred
shareholders—specifically the venture capital investors that wanted to exit—
and not to benefit the common shareholders.232 Indeed, the CEO was hired
one year before and given the express mission of finding a way to sell the
company so that the preferred shareholders could exit without suffering a
substantial loss (or realize a gain, if possible).233
Further, in negotiating the price, the directors’ sole emphasis was not
selling below sixty million dollars.234 The price at which the VC firms would
break even.235 They gave no thought to whether that would produce a return
for the common shareholders (it would not).236
In short, the court found that the process was not fair to the common
shareholders.237
Nevertheless, the court found that the price paid to common
shareholder—$0—was fair because the common shares had no value.238 The
court reasoned that the Trados management found themselves in a catch-22:
the only way to return value to the shareholders was to get new funding; but
SDL (the only potential source) would only provide new funding if it could
purchase Trados outright, wiping out the common shareholders.239
F. Conclusions (or Principles to be Applied)
Weinberger, Lynch, M&F Worldwide and Trados allow us to sketch a
rough outline of what courts in Delaware examine when determining
whether entire fairness is met. That outline is below:

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 56.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. at 61–62.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 76–77.
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Elements of Traditional Entire Fairness Analysis Process
•
•
•
•
•

Was the board fully informed?240 This can include asking for, receiving, and
reviewing a fairness opinion.241
Was information hidden from the board by the acquirer?242
Did the board take a reasonable amount of time to make the decision?243 A rushed
decision—especially when there is no reason for the rush—will weigh against
procedural fairness.244
Was the board diligent245 in protecting the interests of the common
shareholders?246 The board should not agree to the first price offered.247
Was the board coerced? This can be subtle (connections248) or blatant (threats).249
240. Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
241. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1134, 1143 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 1994)
(seeking a fairness opinion strongly weighed in favor of finding procedural fairness); see also
Steven E. Bochner & Amy L. Simmerman, The Venture Capital Board Member’s Survival
Guide: Handling Conflicts Effectively While Wearing Two Hats, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 22
(2016) (“Directors should seek advice from both legal and financial advisors as appropriate.”).
242. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712 (stating that a fair process was not present where
target board was not afforded the opportunity to review the feasibility study prepared by the
acquirer); In re Emerging Comm. Inc. S’holders Litig., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *149
(finding that the fact that directors were provided with incomplete projections undermined
argument for procedural fairness); but see In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., C.A. No.
28-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at *60–63 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that not turning
over stale projections did not impact procedural fairness).
243. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
244. Id. at 712.
245. Bochner & Simmerman, supra note 241, at 22 (nothing that a fair process argument
is stronger where directors acted with diligence); Cathy L. Reese & Kelly A. Herring, Recent
Developments in Delaware Corporate Law, 7 DEL. L. REV. 177, 193 (2004) (demonstrating
that a fair process argument is bolstered by “an active and aggressive search for a third-party
buyer”).
246. The diligence must be exercised in favor of the common shareholders. See In re
Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 40–41 (Del. Ch. 2013) (faulting directors for looking
after interests of VC investors, not common shareholders); see also Bochner & Simmerman,
supra note 241, at 22 (“In all cases, directors should understand their fiduciary duties—
including that their duties run to common stockholders—and this understanding should
motivate the board’s actions.”).
247. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (holding that there is no procedural fairness where
the board of directors agreed to the first price offered); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
868–70 (Del. 1985).
248. Oliver v. Boston Univ., No. 16570-NC, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *66 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 14, 2006) (finding fair process not present where board members faced pressure to side
with majority shareholder); In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., No. 14713, 1999 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 94, at *13–14 (Del. Ch. May 24, 1999) (finding no procedural fairness where
acquirer used a stalking horse to place pressure on the board).
249. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120 (Del. Apr. 5, 1994)
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Process “Plus”
•
•

Was an independent committee of
the board used?
Was a majority of the minority
vote used?

Price
•
•
•

If used together, the standard of review
will return to business judgment under
the MFW framework.250 If only one is
used, it switches the burden of proof
under Lynch.251

Was an accepted methodology used to determine the price? This could be
“discounted cash flow, comparable companies, comparable sale premiums, or a
weighted average of results from more than one approach.”252
Were the assumptions fed into the formula (e.g., discount rate or assumptions as
to future company growth) reasonable?253
Was it the “highest transaction price the market will permit”?254
III. ENTIRE FAIRNESS APPLIED TO BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
The preceding Part examined the traditional approach to entire fairness
review. That approach is focused on confirming that shareholders received
the highest price the market will permit.255 It looks at only one impact
(pecuniary return) on only one constituency (shareholders).256 For that
reason, it is not well suited for review of director decisions at benefit
corporations.
In this Part, I suggest how courts can modify the traditional entire
(indicating that using the threat of a hostile takeover at a lower price weakens procedural
fairness argument); see also In re Cysive, Inc., 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003) (explaining that
a lack of coercion weighed in favor of procedural fairness).
250. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. Mar. 14, 2014).
251. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117.
252. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Bankers and Chancellors, 93 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 14-15 (2014). In Weinberger, the court rejected the Delaware block method as the
sole method of determining fair price. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
253. Delaware courts are not shy about questioning inputs and assumptions used in
discounted cash flow analysis. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, No. 7129, 1990 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 259, at *39 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (“It is the next step, in which he selects inputs for
the equation described above, that I cannot conclude is a reasonable way to do what the model
requires.”).
254. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 15, at 874–75.
255. See supra Parts II.D, II.E, II.F.
256. See supra Parts II.D, II.E, II.F.
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fairness standard of review so that it will apply in the benefit corporation
context. I make suggestions as to procedure and price (in the case of the
price, there are several sub-suggestions). These suggestions can be adopted
piecemeal, or in their totality, as the courts deem appropriate.
A. The Merger Hypothetical
As stated in the introduction, the normative question this Article seeks
to answer is How should Delaware courts apply the entire fairness standard
of review in the benefit corporation context? Consider the following
hypothetical:
Clean, PBC is a Delaware public benefit corporation that uses
captured CO2 to manufacture polypropylene carbonate (a plastic);
that is to say, Clean’s benefit purpose is “to convert a waste
product that causes global warming into something useful.”257
This is a two-step process. First, a manufacturer captures its CO2
emissions and transports them to Clean. Second, Clean uses the
CO2 to manufacture plastics, “trapping” it, and preventing it from
entering the environment.
Clean was formed in 2013 by Controlling, Inc., a manufacturing
giant that produces large amounts of CO2. Controlling’s forwardthinking CEO wanted to create a “free-standing partner” that it
could work with to cut its own CO2 emissions.
Clean has 100,000 shares outstanding. Controlling owns 55,000
shares of Clean. The remaining 45,000 shares are owned by nine
individual shareholders (5,000 shares each).
Since 2013, one-half of the captured CO2 that Clean has used to
manufacture its plastics was provided by Controlling, the other
one-half came from other manufacturers. In all, Clean has
successfully prevented 300,000 metric tons of CO2 from entering
the environment per year,258 and in the process, produced a positive
cash flow of $2,000,000 per year selling its “green” plastics.
(Ironically, these plastics compete with the plastics produced by
257. Bernie Bulkin, Turning Carbon Dioxide Emissions into Chemicals, Fibres and Jet
Fuel, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/ca
rbon-dioxide-chemicals-fibres-jet-fuel-photosynthesis [https://perma.cc/EY3H-R2Y4].
258. This is a modest amount. Microsoft estimates that it will produce 16 million metric
tons of carbon in 2020. Brad Smith, Microsoft Will Be Carbon Negative By 2030, OFFICIAL
MICROSOFT BLOG (Jan. 16, 2020), https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2020/01/16/microsoftwill-be-carbon-negative-by-2030/ [https://perma.cc/U6JN-HASX].
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Controlling.)
However, in 2020, Controlling appoints a new CEO that wants to
“focus on profit maximization.” The CEO decides that Controlling
will only comply with the minimum requirements of the Clean Air
Act, and stop capturing CO2.259
Controlling offers to buy the interests of all nine minority
shareholders at $133.21 per share (a total valuation of
$13,321,029.30) in a cash out merger. Clean will disappear, and
its assets will be absorbed by Controlling.
The five-person board of directors of Clean—each director
beholden to Controlling for their seat—approves the merger by
unanimous vote. Thereafter, the shareholders approve the merger
when Controlling and three other shareholders vote their shares in
favor (70,000 shares or 70%). The remaining six shareholders
voted against. The six opposing shareholders sue to enjoin the
merger, or alternatively, for damages, arguing that the board of
directors violated its fiduciary duties of loyalty and care when it
approved the merger.
B. The Decision to Apply Entire Fairness
Because Controlling’s purchase of Clean is a controlling shareholder
transaction (Controlling owns 55% of Clean), the court should apply the
entire fairness standard of review.260 The similarity to Weinberger is clear;
our hypothetical involves a cash-out merger into a controlling shareholder.261
The dissimilarity to Weinberger is equally clear; our hypothetical involves a
benefit corporation.

259. For purposes of this hypothetical, I am making a simplifying assumption that
Controlling would not otherwise be required to capture its CO2 emissions. In Util. Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA, the supreme court held that the EPA may not treat CO2 from
stationary sources as an air pollutant unless the source is already regulated as a polluter. 573
U.S. 302, 320, 329 (2014). If, to the contrary, Controlling was required by law to implement
Best Available Control Technology (BACT) the loss of public benefit from the transaction
would need to be adjusted accordingly. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing price adjustment
for public benefit reducing transactions).
260. Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 710–11 (Del. 1983).
261. Id.
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C. Fair Process
The first step is for the court to recognize that when applied in the
benefit corporation context, the process employed by the directors (if
employed correctly) is different—and thus how the court conducts its
examination must also be different.
The difference arises because the process now has a dual purpose: (1)
ensuring that shareholders receive the highest transaction price, and (2)
ensuring that the decision is fair to stakeholders and furthers the benefit
purpose (or in DBCL terms, “balances . . . the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public
benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.”262). In
our hypothetical, the parties with interests to be balanced are the shareholders
and stakeholders (primarily the environment) that would be harmed by the
resulting increase in CO2 emissions.
It follows that the court should begin, as it would in the traditional
corporation context, by examining whether the directors asked an investment
bank to prepare a fairness opinion regarding the price to be paid to
shareholders.263 If informed, and not rushed, a fairness opinion can go a long
way toward convincing a court that the process was fair to shareholders
(because it evidences that the board was likewise informed, and not
rushed).264
But the court should also examine whether the board of directors sought
a report regarding the impact of its decision on other stakeholders, in the case
of Clean, the environment. There are two types of report that may serve well
here: the first describes the environmental impact, but does not place a dollar
value on it;265 the second, more difficult to prepare, but arguably more useful
to decision makers (especially because fair price is an issue, as will be
discussed below) is one that measures the environmental impact in dollars.266

262. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2020).
263. See supra Part II.E.1 (discussing the fairness opinion prepared in Weinberger v. UOP,
457 A.2d 701 (Del.1983)).
264. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1134, 1143 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 1994); see
Bochner & Simmerman, supra note 241, at 22 (discussing the importance of a fairness
opinion).
265. There is ample precedent for the preparation of environmental impact statements,
although in a different context, usually how a project (e.g., building a power plant) will impact
the surrounding environment. See Amy L Stein, Climate Change Under Nepa: Avoiding
Cursory Consideration Of Greenhouse Gases, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 473, 474 (2010)
(“Environmental Impact Statement[s] (“EIS”) . . . assesses the impacts, alternatives, and
potential mitigation of . . . proposed action[s].”).
266. For possible valuation methodologies see infra Part III.D.1.
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Further, the other factors that a court considers in determining fair
process in the traditional corporation context are equally applicable. For
example, the court should confirm that the board acted with diligence both
in negotiating the best possible price for shareholders, but also in obtaining
the best possible outcome for stakeholders.267 Based on the facts presented
in our hypothetical, there is no indication that the Clean board of directors
acted diligently with respect to stakeholders, weighing against a finding of
procedural fairness.
D. Fair Price
The price portion of the entire fairness test is more difficult to modify
to fit the benefit corporation context. Here, I suggest three changes that the
court should make when applying entire fairness review to benefit
corporations. The court should:
(1) confirm that the directors made adjustments to the price that
reflect the fact that the entity is a benefit corporation;
(2) be open to new valuation methods that take into account social
impact (as is necessary to achieve (1)); and
(3) where the process was robust, the court should take comfort in
that fact, and be more deferential to the price arrived at by the process.
1. Confirm Adjustments That Reflect the Fact That the Entity Is a
Benefit Corporation
When entire fairness review is being applied to a decision made by the
board of directors of a benefit corporation, the court should confirm that the
directors (or more precisely, their expert) used a method for calculating fair
price that reflects that fact. Let me explain:
When determining fair price, the starting point should still be a
discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, as was the case in Weinberger,268
Lynch269 and Trados.270 As explained by Hood, Mylan and O’Sullivan, “[t]he
DCF method determines the values of the assets of a business to be
equivalent to the future expected cash flows of the entity discounted at a rate
267. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 40–41 (Del. Ch. 2013) (holding fair
process not present where directors did not diligently look after the interests of common
shareholders).
268. Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 712–13 (Del. 1983) (discussing discounted cash
flow analysis).
269. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., No. 8748, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, at *15 (Del. Ch.
July 9, 1993)
270. Trados, 73 A.3d at 72–73.
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reflective of the risks involved in achieving these cash flows.”271 The inputs
include future cash flows (calculated from net income), a discount rate
(representing risk), and a terminal value (which assumes that all assets are
sold off after the final year).272
I will use a simplified DCF analysis to make my point regarding Clean
(it is simplified because I will not adjust the cash flows to reflect future
company growth; I will not include a terminal value).273 I begin by
identifying the future cash flows (here $2,000,000 per year) and choosing a
discount rate (here 15%).274 Using those inputs, the value of the company is:
DCF Analysis for Clean

Future

Discount

Net

Annual Cash

Rate

Present
Value275

Flow

Year 1

2,000,000

15%

$ 1,739,130.43

271. Edwin T. Hood, John J. Mylan & Timothy P. O’Sullivan, Valuation Of Closely Held
Business Interests, 65 UMKC L. REV. 399, 417–18 (1997); see Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness
Opinions, 55 AM. U.L. REV. 1557, 1576 (2006) (discussing the use of discounted cash flow
analysis in fairness opinions).
272. Hood, Mylan & O’Sullivan, supra note 271, at 417–18; Davidoff, supra note 271, at
1576.
273. See Hood, Mylan & O’Sullivan, supra note 271, at 423, 427 (discussing adjustments
for growth factor and terminal value).
274. The discount rate (or cost of capital) represents the time value of money. A promise
to give you $100 today, is worth more than a promise to give you $100 in one year. How
discount rates are calculated are well beyond the scope of this Article. I chose 15% because
it is a round number, simplifying the illustration, and it is within the range of discount rates
used by courts in Delaware. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 884 A.2d 26, 30 (Del.
2005) (using a discount rate of 15.28%); Zutrau v. Jansing, 7457-VCP, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS
156, at *123 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2014) (holding that a 12.9% discount rate accords with
common valuation practices).
275. The net present value of each future cash flow is calculated using the following
formula: PV=FV/(1+r)n, where: PV is present value, FV is future value, r is the discount rate,
and n is the number of years before the cash flow is realized. By way of example, for year
three $1,315,032.46=2,000,000/(1+.15)3.
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Year 2

2,000,000

15%

$ 1,512,287.33

Year 3

2,000,000

15%

$ 1,315,032.46

Year 4

2,000,000

15%

$ 1,143,506.49

Year 5

2,000,000

15%

$ 994,353.47

Year 6

2,000,000

15%

$ 864,655.19

Year 7

2,000,000

15%

$ 751,874.08

Year 8

2,000,000

15%

$ 653,803.55

Year 9

2,000,000

15%

$ 568,524.82

Year 10

2,000,000

15%

$ 494,369.41

Year 11

2,000,000

15%

$ 429,886.45

Year 12

2,000,000

15%

$ 373,814.30

Year 13

2,000,000

15%

$ 325,055.91

Year 14

2,000,000

15%

$ 282,657.32

Year 15

2,000,000

15%

$ 245,788.97

Year 1650276

2,000,000

15%

$ 1,626,289.12

Value of Clean

$13,321,029.30

The DCF calculates the value of Clean is $13,321,029.30, as
Controlling claims. It follows that $133.21 per share is a fair price if Clean
is a traditional corporation. That is to say, if Clean is a traditional
corporation, the court should find that the transaction is entirely fair
(assuming that the process was also adequate).
276. The dollar value of any year beyond fifty would be de minimus.
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However, Clean is a benefit corporation. As such, there must be a
second step in order for the court to properly find that the board of directors
met its obligation to balance “the best interests of those materially affected
by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or public
benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.”277 The court must
confirm that the directors adjusted the calculation of fair price to reflect the
impact of the transaction on the stakeholders and public benefit. There are
three possibilities here:
• A public benefit increasing transaction. The resulting
company will do more to pursue the stated benefit purpose.
Here, the fair price must be adjusted downward.278
• A public benefit decreasing transaction. The resulting
company will do less to pursue the stated benefit purpose.
Here, the fair price must be adjusted upward.279
• A neutral transaction. The resulting company will do the
same to pursue the stated benefit purpose. Here, the fair price
is not adjusted.
The merger of Clean into Controlling is a public benefit decreasing
transaction, so the directors should have adjusted the price they were
negotiating on behalf of the shareholders and other stakeholders—the fair
price—upward to compensate for the loss of the public benefit (i.e., the
benefit to the environment). But then the question becomes, how much
should such adjustment be? Can the dollar value of Clean preventing
300,000 metric tons of CO2 from being released be quantified? It turns out
it can. The value of preventing 300,000 metric tons of CO2 from being
released in 2020 is $2,040,000.280
277. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365 (2020).
278. Adjusting fair price downward in a public benefit increasing transaction may be
counterintuitive (shouldn’t we value transactions that increase public benefit more?). Think
of it like this: the buyer is paying the purchase price to the seller for the business, and then a
portion is paid back (in return for agreeing to increase the public benefit the business creates).
279. Adjusting fair price upward in a public benefit decreasing transaction may be
counterintuitive (shouldn’t we value transactions that decrease public benefit less?). Think
of it like this: the buyer is paying the purchase price to the seller for the business, plus
compensating the seller for the loss of the public benefit.
Further, it may not be intuitive why the shareholders should receive the compensation for the
loss of the public benefit. Here, the idea is that the shareholder (who cares about the public
benefit in question, or they would not have invested in the benefit corporation in the first
place) can put the money to work furthering another public benefit.
280. This is based on $6.80 per metric ton; $6.80 x 300,000 = $2,040,000. For a discussion
of how $26.30 is calculated, see infra Part III.D.1. That number represents the social benefit
for just one year. For a complete analysis:
[T]he benefits from reduced . . . emissions in [all] future year[s] can be estimated
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What becomes clear is that $13,321,029.30 is not a “fair price”. It does
not take into account the elimination of the loss of the public benefit (i.e., the
benefit to the environment). The court should find that the transaction is not
entirely fair.
What could the directors have done to increase the likelihood that the
court would find the transaction entirely fair? The most obvious solution:
the directors could have negotiated a total price equal to the value of Clean
calculated by DCF analysis plus the adjustment for this being a public benefit
decreasing transaction. If Controlling did not agree, the directors would have
a fiduciary duty not to approve the transaction. Alternatively, during the
negotiation process, the directors could have required that Controlling make
concessions unrelated to the price paid to shareholders that would mitigate
the impact on the environment. Again, if Controlling did not agree, the
directors would have a fiduciary duty not to approve the transaction.
In short, the court must confirm that a fair price was reached, both in
terms of price paid to the shareholders, and also in terms of outcome for
stakeholders.
2. Be Open to New Valuation Methods
In order to achieve recommendation 1 above, the court will need to be
open to new valuation methods.281 There are ways to measure the loss of
environmental benefit in monetary terms. They include: damage cost
avoided and substitute cost methods; market price method; productivity
method; hedonic pricing method; travel cost method; contingent valuation
method; contingent choice method; and benefit transfer method (hereinafter
“valuation methods”).282
by multiplying the change in emissions in that year by the SCC value appropriate
for that year. The net present value of the benefits can then be calculated by
multiplying each of these future benefits by an appropriate discount factor and
summing across all affected years.
INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ sites/default/files/o
mb/inforeg/for-agencies/Social-Cost-of-Carbon-for-RIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/685G-TA9H]
[hereinafter INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP.].
281. The Delaware courts are often at the forefront of using new valuation techniques. As
the court in Weinberger stated when it abandoned blind reliance on the Delaware Block
Method, “We believe that a more liberal approach must include proof of value by any
techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial
community. . . .” Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
282. ROBERT A. YOUNG & JOHN B. LOOMIS, DETERMINING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF
WATER: CONCEPTS AND METHODS 107–123 (2005) (discussing various valuation
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Damage Cost Avoided. The United States Government (USG), under
the Obama Administration, used the damage cost avoided method to
calculate the social cost of carbon (SCC).283 The USG states that:
The SCC is an estimate of the monetized damages associated with
an incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given year. It is
intended to include (but is not limited to) changes in net
agricultural productivity, human health, property damages from
increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services due to
climate change.284
The USG used a discounted cash flow analysis to turn those future
damages into a current value, using discount rates of 5, 3 and 2.5%.285 The
results are in the following chart:
Social Cost of CO2, 2010 – 2050 (in 2007 dollars per metric ton)286
Year

Discount Rate

($)
2010

5%
Avg.
4.7

($)

3%
Avg.
21.4

($)

2.5%
Avg.
35.1

methodologies); Frank Pasquale, Toward an Ecology of Intellectual Property: Lessons from
Environmental Economics for Valuing Copyright’s Commons, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 48
(2006) (discussing various valuation techniques including direct use value and indirect use
value); Dennis M. King & Marisa Mazzotta, Dollar-based Ecosystem Valuation Methods,
ECOSYSTEM VALUATION, available at http://www.ecosystemvaluation.org/dollar_based.htm
[https://perma.cc/HF5Q-W2PZ] (last visited Feb. 1, 2020).
283. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP, supra note 280. Quantifying environmental impact in
dollar terms is a long-standing effort spanning several administrations. Since the 1990s the
EPA has been at the forefront of advocating for environmental accounting. See Searching for
the Profit in Pollution Prevention: Case Studies in the Corporate Evaluation of Environmental
Opportunities, EPA No. 742-R-98-005 (1998), at 45 (“[E]nvironmental accounting . . .
reveals a benefit to investment from a process change, a benefit that may not otherwise have
been captured in a capital budgeting decision.”); Mitchell F. Crusto, Endangered Green
Reports: “Cumulative Materiality” In Corporate Environmental Disclosure After SarbanesOxley, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 496 (2005) (“[I]n 1992, the EPA created an Environmental
Accounting Project to “encourage and motivate business to understand the full spectrum of
their environmental costs, and integrate these into decision-making.”).
284. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP, supra note 280, at 1 (using factors developed by R.
Newell & W. Pizer, Discounting the Distant Future: How Much Do Uncertain Rates Increase
Valuations? 46 J. ENV. ECON. & MANAGEMENT 52 (2003)).
285. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP, supra note 280, at 1.
286. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP, supra note 280, at 1.
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2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050

5.7
6.8
8.2
9.7
11.2
12.7
14.2
15.7

887
23.8
26.3
29.6
32.8
36.0
39.2
42.1
44.9

38.4
41.7
45.9
50.0
54.2
58.4
61.7
65.0

For purposes of our hypothetical, I used the SCC for 2020 calculated
using a 5% discount rate. Assuming $6.8 per metric ton, the value of
preventing 300,000 metric tons of CO2 from being released in 2020 is
$2,040,000.
Substitute Cost. Stepping away from our hypothetical for a moment
(after all, not all public benefits are environmental), consider the public
benefit provided by Greyston Bakery, Inc.287 Greyston is a benefit
corporation that hires any applicant, regardless of background—indeed, they
studiously avoid questions regarding background when hiring.288 At
Greyston, “most of the workers have a ‘history’.”289 That may include drug
dealing, theft, or just being homeless.290
The public benefit that Greyston provides to society can be calculated
using the substitution cost method.291 “The substitute cost method is applied
by estimating the costs of providing a substitute for the affected services.”292
In the case of Greyston, the substitute is government supporting the
individuals. For example, if we assume that individuals hired by Greyston
could not otherwise find employment, what is the cost to government
287. GREYSTON BAKERY, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (2019), https://bcorporation.net/directory
/greyston-bakery-inc [https://perma.cc/AA9M-H9SX].
288. Juli Steadman Charkes, Bakery’s ‘Open Hiring’ Offers Anyone a Chance, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/nyregion/employment-bakery
s-open-hiring-offers-anyone-a-chance.html
[https://perma.cc/3H4X-BNY2];
Tina
Rosenberg, No Background Check, Drug Test or Credit Check. You’re Hired!, N.Y. TIMES
(May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/opinion/greyston-bakery-open-hiring
.html [https://perma.cc/8CGT-LSHF].
289. Charkes, supra note 288; Rosenberg, supra note 288.
290. Charkes, supra note 288; Rosenberg, supra note 288.
291. Dennis M. King & Marisa Mazzotta, Damage Cost Avoided, Replacement Cost, and
Substitute Cost Methods, ECOSYSTEM VALUATION, available at http://www.ecosystemvaluat
ion.org/cost_avoided.htm [https://perma.cc/GTJ5-VD8Q] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020); see
Antonia Sajardo & Inmaculada Serra, The Economic Value of Volunteer Work:
Methodological Analysis and Application to Spain, 40 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECT. Q.
873 (2011) (using the substitution cost method to value the work of volunteers).
292. King & Mazzotta, supra note 291.
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supporting those individuals per year? The costs of Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Programs
(SNAP), and housing assistance per individual can be calculated on a yearly
basis. 293
Of course, such methods are open to criticism that they are plagued by
uncertainty.294 However, “[m]ere uncertainty in valuation . . . does not
preclude [these valuation methods] from offering valuable information to
courts.”295 The courts are often called upon to price the unpriceable, such as
in the case of pain and suffering—it does not mean that courts should limit
plaintiffs recovery to medical expenses only.296
Further, the entire fairness process, reliant as it is on DCF analysis, is
already uncertain.297 “[T]he large number of subjective judgments that need
to be made when performing a valuation analysis (choice of comparables,
estimating future cash flows, choice of a discount rate, etc.) creates fertile
opportunities for widely divergent conclusions.”298 Yet the Delaware courts
have managed, in the past, to apply entire fairness despite these uncertainties.
The environmental or social cost of a decision, while a further uncertainty,
293. See Government Benefits, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/benefits [https://perma.cc
/DQ5Z-Z438] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020) (listing social welfare programs). Another option
is a more generic impact statement. In fact, some municipalities have passed ordinances
requiring them when a factory closes. The city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, passed an
ordinance mandating that firms about to close a factory issue an economic impact statement.
Michael H. Shuman, GATTzilla v. Communities, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 527, 532 (1994). The
ordinance was later invalidated on the grounds that the city had exceeded its power. Id. (citing
Smaller Mfrs. Council v. Council of Pittsburgh, 485 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984)).
294. In fact, the work of the USG, summarized above, contains the following disclaimer:
When attempting to assess the incremental economic impacts of carbon dioxide
emissions, the analyst faces a number of serious challenges. A recent report from
the National Academies of Science (NRC 2009) points out that any assessment
will suffer from uncertainty, speculation, and lack of information about (1) future
emissions of greenhouse gases, (2) the effects of past and future emissions on the
climate system, (3) the impact of changes in climate on the physical and
biological environment, and (4) the translation of these environmental impacts
into economic damages. As a result, any effort to quantify and monetize the
harms associated with climate change will raise serious questions of science,
economics, and ethics and should be viewed as provisional.
INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP, supra note 280, at 2.
295. Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using Contingent
Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 884 (1994).
296. Id.
297. Brief Amici Curiae of Law Professors at 10, DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value
Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) (No. 518, 2016, at 10) [hereinafter DFC Amici
Curiae Brief].
298. Daniel R. Fischel, Market Evidence in Corporate Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 941, 943
(2002).
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is one that the courts are equipped to handle in the context of entire fairness
analysis.
Finally, despite the uncertainty some companies are already
incorporating such valuations into their internal decision-making processes.
For example, Microsoft imposes an internal $15 per metric ton SCC fee
(while it is unclear whether Microsoft used the USG figures to arrive at that
amount,299 it is interesting that $15 fits squarely within the range of
estimates—$6.8 to $41.7—for 2020).
At Microsoft, managers calculate the cost that their decision will have
on the environment and treat it as an actual expense. According to Microsoft:
“[e]ach quarter, the organizational divisions obligated under the program are
charged a fee reflecting projected emissions.”300 The division then pays the
fee into a Carbon Neutral Fee Fund.301 Microsoft invests the money from
that fund into green initiatives.302
Another criticism is that adjusting the price upward may result in double
counting. That is to say, the cash flow of $2,000,000 per year may already
capture the positive externality. However, that assumes (1) that customers
are paying more for products that are manufactured from captured CO2,303
and (2) that the increased price is equal to the environmental benefit created.
This is a good segue to the point made in the next section: where a
robust process was employed by the board of directors, the court should be
willing to let that fact provide some comfort that a fair price was achieved.
It is the board of directors that is in the best position to determine if the
corporation’s cash flows incorporate all, some, or none of the positive
externalities resulting from the manner in which the plastic is produced. As
long as that question was diligently considered by the board—i.e., the
process was fair—the court should trust the price arrived at.

299. Professor Light writes that “Microsoft sets the fee by examining the price for carbon
offsets.” Sarah E. Light, The New Insider Trading: Environmental Markets within the Firm,
34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 44 (2015) (quoting Telephone Interview with Robert Bernard, Chief
Environmental Strategist, Microsoft Corp. (June 4, 2014)).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. This is far from a forgone conclusion. See Shuqin Wei, Tyson Ang, Vivien E.
Jancenelle, Willingness to Pay More for Green Products: The Interplay of Consumer
Characteristics and Customer Participation, 45 J. RETAILING & CONSUMER SERV. 230, 230
(2018) (discussing that evidence evaluating consumers’ willingness to pay more for green
products has been mixed); Céline Michaud and Daniel Llerena, Green Consumer Behaviour:
An Experimental Analysis of Willingness to Pay for Remanufactured Products, 20 BUS.
STRATEGY & ENV’T 408, 417 (2011) (finding consumers are not willing to pay a premium for
green products).
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3. Revitalize the Fair Process Portion of the Entire Fairness Test
In Delaware, the courts are very comfortable calculating fair price. As
one commentator pointed out, “Delaware courts have become quite
sophisticated in reviewing valuation analyses and are thoroughly conversant
in the related, highly technical financial arcana.”304
A great illustration of this is In re PNB.305 In that case the court picked
apart the experts’ discounted cash flow analysis, and conducted its own.306
The court focused on the cash flow and the discount rate.307 As to the cash
flow, the court found flaws with the calculations of both experts, and so
chose a point in between.308 Likewise, as to the discount rate, the court was
not satisfied with the recommendation of either expert and used 12%
(between 11.5% recommended by the plaintiff, and 14% recommended by
the defendant).309 As such, using its own inputs, the court arrived at a fair
price of $52.34 per share, which was $11.34 per share higher than that paid
by the company to cash out the plaintiffs, and awarded the plaintiffs that
amount in damages.310
Because the courts are so confident in their ability to conduct a DCF
analysis, they often gloss over the fair process portion of the entire fairness
test.311 But the fair price in a transaction involving a benefit corporation is
304. William A. Groll & David Leinwand, Judge and Banker—Valuation Analyses in the
Delaware Courts, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 957, 959 (2012). A recent Brief Amici Curiae by
finance professors was critical of this point, arguing “[a]ppraisal proceedings have hardly
been the Delaware courts’ finest moments.” DFC Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 297
(quoting William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The
Delaware Courts’ Struggle with Control Premiums, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 845 (2003)). It
further criticized that Delaware courts “cobble together a discounted cash flow model from
the disparate proposals of the parties’ experts. Respectfully, however, judges are ill-equipped
to undertake that task.” Id.
305. In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 28-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158,
at *98–117 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at *104–08.
309. Id. at *108–14.
310. Id. at *116–17.
311. Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 711 (1983) (“[W]e recognize that price may be
the preponderant consideration outweighing other features of the merger.”); Monroe County
Emp. Retire. Sys. v. Carlson, No. 4587-CC, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 132, at *6 (Del. Ch. June
7, 2010) (“Fair price . . . is often the paramount consideration.”); Valeant Pharms. Int’l v.
Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 748 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The court’s finding that [defendants] used an
unfair process to authorize the bonuses does not end the court’s inquiry because it is possible
that the pricing terms were so fair as to render the transaction entirely fair.”); PNB Holding,
2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at *86 (2006) (“As in most fairness cases, the ultimate issue of
fairness turns on my perception of the economics. That is, did the defendants cause the
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more nuanced (as should be clear from above). In some ways, it is more
elusive. I am not saying that the court should not try to calculate a fair price
(indeed, no court is better equipped to do so than the Delaware Court of
Chancery). The court should certainly be willing to calculate a number
within a range, as suggested in the sections above.
My point is simply this: in cases where a robust process was employed
by the board of directors, the court should also be willing to let that fact
provide some comfort that a fair price was achieved.312 After all, the reason
that fair process is included in the analysis is because a robust process is
more likely to produce a fair price.313
E. Application of The MFW Framework
Many of the difficulties inherent in applying the entire fairness standard
of review in the benefit corporation context can be avoided if the controlling
shareholder conditions the merger on approval by a special committee and a
majority of the minority vote, that is to say, follow the MFW framework.314
However, there are some slight differences between how the MFW
framework is applied to the traditional corporation context, and how it would
need to be applied in the benefit corporation context. The framework itself
remains the same: the court will apply the more deferential business
judgment standard where a transaction is conditioned on approval by a
special committee of the target and a majority of the minority vote.315
The difference is how the special committee must operate, and how the
consent of a majority of the minority must be obtained.
As to the special committee, it must be informed, and that means
informed of both impacts to shareholders and stakeholders.316 Further, it

corporation to pay a fair price?”).
312. See Bochner & Simmerman, supra note 241, at 24 (where a robust process was used,
courts are more likely to defer on the question of price); Daniel E. Meyer, Maybe Publius Was
Right: Relying On Merger Price To Determine Fair Value In Delaware Appraisal Cases, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 153, 176 (2016) (“[T]here may be certain instances where the court does not
have particular expertise and cannot fall back on default presumptions to determine the
appropriate inputs. Under such circumstances, the court cannot credibly conduct a DCF
analysis, and as a result, has at times resorted to the merger price achieved in
a robust sales process.”).
313. Carlson, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 132, at *6 (“Quite frankly, Delaware law focuses on
fair dealing in controlling shareholder transactions primarily because a fair price is more
likely to follow fair dealing.”).
314. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644–45 (Del. 2014).
315. Cf. id.
316. Cf. id.
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must be fully empowered.317 It must have the power to say no.318
Traditionally, that means that the special committee can veto any transaction
not in the best interests of the shareholders.319 In the benefit corporation
context, the special committee must have the power to veto any transaction
not in the best interest of the shareholders, or stakeholders or the company’s
benefit mission (although the last two are inextricably intertwined). That is
the only approach that is consistent with the directors’ duty to balance the
interest of shareholders and stakeholders.320
Finally, the MFW framework also requires that the majority of the
minority vote be informed and uncoerced.321 Traditionally, that means that
the shareholders must receive all information necessary to calculate a fair
price for their shares.322 In the benefit corporation context, in addition, the
investors must be provided with information regarding how stakeholders and
the corporation’s benefit purpose will be impacted. After all, investors in
benefit corporations, who were likely motivated to invest in a benefit
corporation by its benefit purpose, have an interest in ensuring that benefit
purpose is furthered.
IV. WHAT ABOUT OPERATIONAL DECISIONS?
Up until now, this Article, with its focus on Weinberger, Lynch, MFW
and Trados, may have left the reader with the impression that entire fairness
only applies when there is a decision to merge, acquire, or be acquired. That
is not the case. It also applies to operational decisions where there is a
controlling shareholder or interested board. The range of operational
decisions that may be implicated include: “(1) security issuances, purchases,
and repurchases; (2) asset leases and acquisitions; (3) compensation
arrangements, consulting agreements, and service agreements; (4)
settlements of derivative actions; and (5) recapitalizations.”323

317. Cf. id. at 644. The court points out that the special committee must be (1)
independent, (2) empowered to freely select its own advisors and to say no definitively, and
(3) meet its duty of care in negotiating a fair price. Id. at 645.
318. Cf. id. at 644–45.
319. Id.
320. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365 (2020).
321. M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 644–45.
322. Id.
323. IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, No. 12742-CB, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 869, at
*18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017) (citations omitted).

2020]

TERRA INCOGNITA

893

A. Traditional Corporation—Summa v. TWA
Summa v. Trans World Airline, Inc. involved the well-known American
air carrier, Trans World Airline (TWA)324 and its equally well-known
majority owner, Howard Hughes.325 Hughes owned 100% of Toolco, and in
turn, Toolco owned 78% of TWA.326 Toolco, which had operational control
of TWA, prohibited TWA from purchasing its own aircraft.327 Instead,
Toolco purchased the aircraft and sold them to TWA at a profit.328 (That, in
turn, enriched Hughes.)
Although the case did not involve a decision to merge, acquire, or be
acquired, the court begins by citing the recently decided case of Weinberger
for the “well established” proposition “that one who stands on both sides of
a transaction has the burden of proving its entire fairness.”329 The court
found that the transaction at issue was with a controlling entity, Toolco,
which was a 78% shareholder in TWA.330
The court then turned to applying the entire fairness standard of review
articulated in Weinberger.331 The court found that the TWA board’s process
for making the decision to purchase the aircraft from Toolco was not fair,
because it was entirely dominated by Toolco and Hughes.332 (The court
suggested that a vote of independent directors would have helped an
argument that the process was fair.)333 The board was prohibited from
seeking out competing bids with which it could negotiate down the price it
paid to Toolco.334
Given the issues with the process, it should come as no surprise that the
resulting price was unfair to TWA.335 Toolco purchased the aircraft at fair
market value and then sold them to TWA at a profit.336 Over the years, this
inefficient approach (but beneficial to Toolco and Hughes) resulted in
significant amounts being diverted from TWA to Toolco and Hughes.337 In

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

TWA operated from 1930 to 2001.
Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 404 (Del. 1988).
Id. at 404–05.
Id. at 405.
Id.
Id. at 406–07 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)).
Id. at 407.
Id. (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 407–08.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 406.
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short, the court found that the transaction was not entirely fair.338
B. Benefit Corporation—Pirron v. Impact Makers
As stated in the introduction, as of the date of writing, there is no case
law regarding the application of the entire fairness standard of review in the
benefit corporation context. However, there is one (and only one, that I am
aware of) lawsuit that settled before any decisional law could be written:
Pirron v. Impact Makers, Inc.339 As alleged,340 the facts of the case are
complicated (the broader allegation is that management tried to freeze-out
the founder Michael Pirron because he blocked proposals to compensate
Impact Makers’ traditionally volunteer board and blocked implementation
of a bonus plan for executives),341 and I simplify them for purposes of this
Article, focusing on the director pay aspect of the case.
Impact Makers (IM) was incorporated as a benefit corporation in
Virginia in 2015.342 IM offered information technology and management
consulting services with an “all profits to charity” model (similar to
Newman’s Own).343 Its articles of incorporation were clear that its
management would consider the impact of its actions on its stockholders and
stakeholders.344 The articles of incorporation further provide that IM would
follow a profits to charity business model (the “PtoC Business Model”).345
In practice, it donated 100% of its profits to charity.346
IM’s eleven-member board of directors had always served for free.347
However, in 2017 the board became worried that it was becoming more
difficult to retain directors.348 As such, the board of directors began to explore
338. Id. at 407.
339. Complaint, Pirron v. Impact Makers, Inc., No. CL 19-2358-3 (Va. Cir. Ct., filed May
8, 2019), https://michaelpirron.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Pirron-v-Impact-Makers_S
tamped-w-Exhibits.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCS6-PTQK] [hereinafter Pirron Complaint].
340. The facts of Pirron v. Impact Makers, as presented in this Article, are borrowed from
the allegations in the Pirron Complaint. It must be remembered that allegations in a complaint
are just that, allegations.
341. John Reid Blackwell, Impact Makers’ Founder, Former CEO Files Suit Against the
Consulting Firm, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, May 16, 2019, at A1.
342. Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, ¶ 2.
343. Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, ¶ 10.
344. Impact Makers, Inc., Fourth Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation 1 (Dec.
30, 2015), reprinted in Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, at Exhibit 2.
345. Id.
346. Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, ¶ 15.
347. Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, ¶ 29.
348. In Michael Pirron’s report opposing the compensation plan, he discussed interviews
with several past directors. See Report from Michael Pirron to Board of Directors of Impact
Makers, Inc. and IM Holdings, Inc., (July 23, 2017) [hereinafter Pirron Report], reprinted in
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the possibility of paying themselves.349
After some research, they proposed to pay themselves $1000 per
quarter.350 It is not clear that the plan was implemented, but the complaint in
the matter stated that the board of directors violated its fiduciary duty by
“failing to consider all of the Stakeholders in weighing whether they should
approve a proposal to compensate themselves for their service on IM’s Board
of Directors.”351
The benefit enforcement proceeding (a type of derivative action)352 was
brought by Michael Pirron, the founder of the company and the sole
dissenting member of the board of directors.353 While the case settled before
any decisional law could be written, Pirron’s allegations, together with
contemporaneous documents attached to the complaint, paint a picture of
how entire fairness review of an operational decision in the benefit
corporation context may work.
First, because the matter involved board members approving their own
compensation, it is likely that a court would have reviewed the matter using
the entire fairness standard of review.354 Here, the main focus is process
(there are no allegations regarding whether the pay constituted a “fair price”
for purpose of entire fairness analysis).
Where an operational decision is involved, fair process is often shown
by the board informing itself using comparables.355 In the case of IM, the
Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, at Exhibit 4. Such interviews were mixed with regards to
the need for compensation to retain directors. Id. One past director did state that she “would
have renewed for another term if the Board role was compensated.” Id.
349. Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, ¶¶ 29–37.
350. Proposal for Impact Makers Board Compensation 4 (June 21, 2017) [hereinafter
Compensation Proposal], reprinted in Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, at Exhibit 3.
351. Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, ¶ 118(c).
352. Va. Code Ann. § 13.1–790 (2011) (providing that benefit enforcement proceedings
may be brought by a shareholder or director).
353. Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, ¶ 1. “[Other] shareholders subsequently
backed Pirron’s litigation, including Jerry Greenfield, the co-founder of Ben & Jerry’s Ice
Cream. . . .” John Reid Blackwell, Richmond-Based Impact Makers and Its Founder Settle
Lawsuit, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, June 18, 2019, at 1A.
354. In Williams v. Ji, directors of Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc. granted to themselves stock
options in several wholly owned subsidiaries. No. 12729-VCMR, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 115,
at *13 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2017). The court found that entire fairness applied because “[t]he
Sorrento board approved the Grants, and every member of the board at the time of the Grants
was interested in them, as [all directors] received options.” Id.; see Steiner v. Meyerson, No.
13139, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995) (applying entire fairness to executive
compensation decision).
355. Carlson v. Hallinan, 925 A.2d 506, 536 (Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting comparison to
service contract it where involved different work); Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 407 (finding that failure to seek out competing bids weighs against
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board gathered some information regarding what other for-profit
corporations pay their board members, but they failed to consider what
companies that follow the PtoC Business Model pay.356
Pirron prepared a report opposed to the proposal, which importantly,
included information regarding a more appropriate comparable, Newman’s
Own, another corporation that followed the PtoC Business Model.357 In fact,
he attached to the report a letter from Newman’s Own’s CEO stating that its
directors were not compensated:
In my travels lecturing and promoting [philanthropic enterprises,
including Newman’s Own358] it is not unusual for there to be an
initial level of skepticism about the commitment to contribute
100% of profits to charity, and one of the most persuasive aspects
of the case to be made, is my ability to point to my own Board of
Directors, noting that our directors are . . . not compensated.359
According to the Pirron Complaint, IM’s board of directors refused to
consider the report (which attached the above referenced letter).360 Even
worse, despite the fact that IM is a Virginia benefit corporation—and
therefore the board of directors is required to balance the interests of
shareholders and stakeholders361—the board of directors did not do so.362
The board of directors should have reviewed information regarding how the
following stakeholders would be impacted: Clients (they chose IM over
competitors based on the fact that IM is a benefit corporation following the
PtoC Business Model); Employees (they may value working at a benefit
corporation following the PtoC Business Model; Charity Partners (they
receive the benefit of the PtoC Business Model); and Shareholders (they
procedural fairness).
356. Compensation Proposal, supra note 350, at 4.
357. See Pirron Report, supra note 348.
358. Technically, Newman’s Own is not a benefit corporation. It is a corporation owned
100% by a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit. But the purpose of the structure is the same as forming a
benefit corporation; it allows the company to pursue profit and purpose—in the case of
Newman’s own, giving away 100% of profits to charity. 100% Profits to Charity, NEWMAN’S
OWN https://www.newmansown.com/100-percent-profits-to-charity/ [https://perma.cc/84C9GDAS] (last visited Apr. 11, 2020); see Haskel Murray, For Profit and Foundation Owned,
BUS. L. PROF. BLOG. (May 1, 2015), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/0
5/for-profit-and-foundation-owned.html [https://perma.cc/J8RS-BKTV] (“[A]s a practical
matter, the benefit corporation and c-corporation forms may operate similarly when whollyowned by one or more foundations.”).
359. Letter from Robert Forester, CEO of Newman’s Own, to Michael Pirron, CEO of
Impact Makers, (July 15, 2017), attached to Pirron Report, supra note 348.
360. Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, ¶¶ 32–33.
361. Va. Code Ann. § 13.1–788 (2011).
362. Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, ¶ 31.
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invested in a benefit corporation following the PtoC Business Model).363
Further, according to the Pirron Complaint, Pirron did prepare a
stakeholder analysis, but as was the case with the letter from the CEO of
Newman’s Own, the board of directors refused to consider it.364
The case settled in June 2019 with Pirron Reinstated as a permanent
director.365 It was widely seen as a win for benefit corporations. The attorney
for Michael Pirron stated:
[This Social Enterprise, IM] was jeopardized in April 2019 by a
Board of Directors whose vision for the company did not align
with its governing documents that were drafted to protect the
company’s public benefit mission.
Fortunately, Michael [Pirron] received a settlement that . . .
ensure[d] that IM’s pledged gift to the community is fulfilled. We
achieved that along with other key protections. This lawsuit was
the first benefit enforcement proceeding in the United States and
we are satisfied with the outcome . . . .366
CONCLUSION
Benefit corporations are a relatively new form of business organization,
but already, social entrepreneurs have formed over seven thousand in the
United States.367 Of that number, over twelve hundred are formed in
Delaware.368 It is inevitable that at some point the Delaware courts will be
called upon to review a board decision at one of those benefit corporations
using entire fairness analysis. (And many times thereafter.)
Applying the entire fairness standard of review to a benefit corporation
is more difficult than applying it to a traditional corporation, where the court
confirms that the directors considered only one impact (pecuniary return) on
only one constituency (shareholders).369 The court will need to confirm that
the directors “balance[d] the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best
363. Pirron Report, supra note 348.
364. Pirron Complaint, supra note 339, ¶¶ 32–33.
365. Blackwell, supra note 353, at 1A.
366. Tricia Dunlap, Why the Impact Makers B Corp Lawsuit Matters to All of Us, DUNLAP
LAW (June 17, 2019), https://dunlaplawplc.com/why-the-impact-makers-b-corp-lawsuit-matt
ers-to-all-of-us/ [https://perma.cc/H68N-3B95].
367. Ellen Berrey, Social Enterprise Law in Action: Organizational Characteristics of
U.S. Benefit Corporations, 20 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 21, 44 (2018) (building an
inventory of 7704 benefit corporations).
368. Id. at 52 (finding that 16% of benefit corporations are formed in Delaware).
369. See supra Parts II.D, II.E.
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interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the
specific public benefit . . . identified in its certificate of incorporation.”370
The court will be called upon to embark upon its own balancing
analysis, a journey into terra incognita, uncharted territory. This Article set
out to answer this normative question: how should Delaware courts conduct
entire fairness review of a board decision at a benefit corporation?
As set out in detail above, the answer to the normative question posed
is as follows: when conducting the fair process portion of the entire fairness
test, in addition to confirming that the board of directors gathered
information about the impact of the decision on shareholders, the court
should also confirm that the board of directors gathered information about
the impact of the decision on stakeholders.371 When conducting the fair price
portion of the entire fairness test, the court should:
(1) confirm that the directors made adjustments to the price that
reflect the fact that the entity is a benefit corporation;372
(2) be open to new valuation methods that take into account social
impact (as is necessary to achieve (1));373 and
(3) where the process was robust, the court should take comfort in
that fact, and be more deferential to the price arrived at by the parties.374

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2020).
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.D.1.
See supra Part III.D.2.
See supra Part III.D.3.

